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Abstract
This article develops an empirical model of firms’ choice of corporate laws
under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently
Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a siz-
able market share. Using a novel database of incorporation decisions from 1995-
2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover
statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the
preferences of small firms. Our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware
would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws.
Our findings support the hypothesis that Delaware faces competitive pressure to
maintain its current laws, and that managers are willing to commit to such laws
in order to attract capital.
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1 Introduction
There is a longstanding debate in corporate law and governance over the merit of com-
petition for corporate laws. U.S. firms may choose to incorporate in any state, and each
state’s corporate laws may embed a different set of corporate governance rules. The debate
has traditionally been divided between those who believe competition for charters produces
efficient corporate laws that maximize firm value (e.g., Winter, 1977; Romano, 1985; East-
erbrook & Fischel, 1991; Romano, 1993), and others who argue that legal regimes produced
by state competition may benefit managers at the expense of shareholders’ interests (e.g.,
Cary, 1974; Bebchuk, 1992; Bebchuk & Ferrell, 1999; Barzuza & Smith, 2014). Delaware
famously dominates the market for incorporations (with more than 60 percent of total in-
corporations). Proponents of regulatory competition emphasize that Delaware, a state that
offers laws that facilitate takeover activity and has a specialized judiciary known for its cor-
porate law expertise, is the winner of this race. Critics, on the other hand, emphasize that
many states manage to retain large domestic corporations by offering anti-takeover laws that
protect managers, and point to the recent rise in the market share of Nevada, a state that
offers very protectionist laws that exempt managers from liability for breach of fiduciary
duties. Finally, skeptics of competition argue that it is impossible for states to compete with
Delaware by simply replicating its laws, and that relatively few firms reincorporate from
one state to another (Klausner, 1995; Kamar, 1998; Kahan & Kamar, 2002; Bebchuk &
Hamdani, 2002; Broughman et al., 2014).
In this article we weigh in on this debate by estimating whether firms prefer to be governed
by laws that are relatively shareholder-friendly or laws that primarily protect managers’
interests.1 More importantly, we evaluate the intensity of competition by examining whether
these preferences are strong enough to generate shifts in market share when states change
their corporate laws. If demand for corporate law is inelastic, firms care little about whether
1Following Romano (1985), Bebchuk & Cohen (2003) and Barzuza & Smith (2014), we treat
firms as consumers and corporate governance laws as products.
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corporate laws facilitate takeovers or entrench managers, and such laws have a limited effect
on firms’ incorporation decisions. On the other hand, if firms do express preferences for a
particular set of laws, then the question is how strong these preferences are, and whether
they can generate shifts in market share despite the apparent inertia in firms’ incorporation
decisions. For example, if firms strongly prefer protectionist laws, there is a concern that
managers influence firms to incorporate in states whose laws advance managers’ interests at
the expense of shareholder welfare, and that states could attract market share by offering
more protection for managers. By contrast, if firms manifest preferences for incorporating
under less protectionist laws, this is evidence that managers yield to shareholders’ pressure
to adopt laws that facilitate takeovers and monitoring of management, and thus regulatory
competition generates laws that promote shareholders’ welfare.
In order to address these questions, we develop a structural model of firms’ incorporation
decisions over time in the spirit of models of demand in industrial organization (see Ackerberg
et al., 2007). We estimate the model using newly formed panel data on public firms’ states of
incorporation from 1995-2013. In our model, heterogeneous firms may choose to incorporate
in one of 51 states each year, and states’ laws are treated as bundles of characteristics,
such as anti-takeover statutes and laws that protect managers from liability. There are two
main advantages to using a structural empirical model of firms’ choices instead of “reduced
form” methods. First, we can allow firm heterogeneity to be reflected in firm preferences.
For example, large firms with high institutional shareholding may be more attentive to
shareholders’ interests than small firms with high insider ownership.2 Second, we can use
the model to consider where firms would decide to incorporate following counterfactual
changes in states’ laws. Without evaluating such counterfactuals, it is impossible to assess
the intensity of regulatory competition, and whether states face significant pressure on the
demand side to maintain shareholder-friendly laws or laws that protect managers.
2While we follow the literature on corporate charters in treating firms as consumers, allowing for
firm heterogeneity accounts for the fact that firms’ decisions are the product of internal dynamics
between shareholders and managers.
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A key feature of the model is that firms’ decisions may be subject to “rational” inertia.
Given that most firms tend to stay incorporated in the same state, it is unrealistic to assume
that each firm makes a new incorporation decision every year. Firms may be sluggish to
respond to legal changes, and thus failure to reincorporate following legal changes does not
necessarily imply indifference to the substance of the law. Thus, we assume that after
the initial incorporation decision when a firm becomes public, each firm makes a conscious
choice of its state of incorporation with only some probability. We estimate this probability
from the data. By adding the inertia element, we identify firms’ preferences primarily from
those firm year observations in which firms make conscious incorporation decisions, rather
than from the decision to stay in the same state. The model we develop is related to recent
models of decision-making that allow for rational inertia in other contexts, such as consumers’
inattention to cars’ energy efficiency (Sallee, 2014) and choice of Medicare Part D plan (Ho
et al., 2017).
Our data is novel in two main respects. First, most existing databases do not include
accurate historical information on firms’ states of incorporation. We address this issue by
parsing public disclosure documents (10-Ks, 8-Ks and 10-Qs) available on the SEC website
to retrieve accurate historical information on all public firms for which we have financial
data. Our final database consists of more than 80,000 firm year observations and 8,700
firms. Second, we focus not only on anti-takeover laws, but also add indices to capture the
level of liability protection for directors and officers under each state’s laws. These indices
measure the extent to which firms can exempt and indemnify managers for violating their
fiduciary duties. The main motivation for constructing these indices is to assess recent claims
that Nevada has attracted firms by exempting directors and officers from the duty of loyalty.
Our main finding is that inertia in decision-making camouflages the extent to which firms
may prefer particular corporate governance provisions. Firms of average size and institutional
ownership show strong dislike for protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes, and laws
that protect officers from liability. Aversion for these laws is particularly strong for large
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firms with high institutional shareholding, and it increases when the takeover activity in the
relevant industry increases. More importantly, demand for these laws is sufficiently elastic
to generate market shifts. Our counterfactual analysis indicates that if Delaware changed its
laws to adopt stronger anti-takeover protections, it could lose about 11 percent of its market
share and between $35-$70 million in franchise taxes per year. These findings are consistent
with other studies of regulatory competition that support the “bonding” hypothesis, which
asserts that managers are willing to commit to stronger shareholder monitoring to attract
capital (see e.g., Doidge et al., 2004; Karolyi and Taboada, 2015).
We further find that the recent shift of firms to Nevada is mainly due to its strong liability
protections for officers. However, such protections appeal to the preferences of small firms
with low institutional shareholding. Therefore, Nevada does not seem to create pressure
on Delaware to cater to managerial interests, as Delaware’s revenues derive primarily from
larger firms that pay higher franchise fees. The results thus also support the hypothesis that
regulatory competition promotes market segmentation and regulatory diversity by allow-
ing heterogeneous firms to self-select into different corporate governance regimes (Barzuza,
2012). While larger firms with high institutional shareholding favor market-oriented laws
that give relatively strong protection to shareholders, a segment of small firms have stronger
preferences for laws that cater to managerial interests.
To be sure, several factors make the market for corporate laws relatively static and reduce
the likelihood of reincorporations and market share shifts. In particular, Delaware derives
much of its market power from unobservable benefits, presumably the quality of its courts
and network benefits, which we include in our model as time-invariant fixed effects. Thus, we
show in counterfactuals that states cannot compete with Delaware by copying its statutory
code, as many skeptics of competition predict. In fact, we even predict that Nevada would
lose market share if it adopted Delaware’s shareholder-friendly laws. Moreover, we find
that firm incorporation decisions are subject to significant inertia, and firms have a strong
tendency to incorporate in the state where they are located, presumably to benefit from
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local influence. However, our results indicate that there is significant competitive pressure
on Delaware to provide adequate protection to shareholders.
Our study is related to a vast literature in law and economics on regulatory competition
for corporate charters.3 An influential strand of this literature argues that the substance
of corporate law matters relatively little for incorporation decisions. Firms may prefer to
incorporate in the same state as other firms to benefit from network externalities, learning
benefits (Klausner, 1995; Kahan & Klausner, 1997; Kamar, 1998; Kahan & Kamar, 2002)
and familiarity of the law (Broughman et al., 2014).4 On this view, demand for corporate
laws is inelastic, and Delaware is bound to maintain its position irrespective of the substance
of its laws or the laws of other states.
However, there are good reasons to believe that demand for corporate law is not as
inelastic as some argue. There is evidence that Delaware’s legislature has been particularly
responsive in adapting its corporate laws to business needs (Romano, 1985). Additionally,
there is historical evidence that Delaware attracted incorporations by liberalizing its director
liability statute in 1967 and 1986 (Moodie, 2004). Recently, Nevada has acquired a small
but significant market share of incorporations following changes to its laws in 2001 that
exempted managers from liability for breach of fiduciary duties. (Barzuza, 2012; Barzuza
& Smith, 2014). The segmentation of the market into Delaware’s market-oriented law and
Nevada’s protectionist regime suggests that firms do respond to legal changes.
Moreover, accounts of inertia in market shares ignore another source of inertia, which
is inertia in corporate decision-making. Such inertia may lead firms to respond slowly to
legal changes. Thus, due to inertia, firms may fail to express their preferences for particular
legal rules. In making incorporation decisions, firms need to bear the costs of (a) seeking
3The literature as well as this article focuses on public corporations; for analysis of the incorpo-
ration choices of private firms, see Damman & Schündeln (2009).
4 Network externalities include interpretative certainty arising from the likelihood that legal
rules will be litigated and clarified in the future, the accumulation of business practice, and the
availability of legal advice. Learning benefits emanate from the large body of legal precedents that
increase the predictability of the law. Network externalities and learning benefits further make law
firms, investors and managers more familiar with Delaware law.
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legal advice, (b) evaluating changing economic conditions (e.g., whether a takeover is likely
or not), and (c) assessing how different laws would affect the firm (for example, by enabling
managers to use certain anti-takeover tactics).5 Firms are unlikely to bear these costs unless
there is an alternative law that is particularly attractive to the firm. By incorporating such
inertia into our model, we are able to uncover firms’ implicit preferences for corporate law,
and show that demand for corporate law is elastic.
A second influential body of literature argues that firms prefer to incorporate in states
that protect managers’ interests at the expense of shareholders. In particular, Bebchuk &
Cohen (2003) find that firms are more likely to incorporate in their home state (and less
likely to incorporate in Delaware) if that state adopts anti-takeover statutes.
It is questionable however whether this study succeeds in evaluating the direction of com-
petition. After all, most firms choose to incorporate in Delaware, which is less protective of
managers than other states. As discussed below, while Delaware courts permit firms to use
anti-takeover devices, Delaware is generally regarded as takeover-friendly compared to other
states that have adopted many anti-takeover laws and apply a lenient standard of review
to anti-takeover devices (Romano, 2006; Barzuza, 2009).More specifically, if anti-takeover
statutes attracted more firm incorporations, then states that adopted such statutes would
increase their market share of incorporations, or at least prevent local firms from reincorpo-
rating in Delaware. However, as we show below, states that adopted anti-takeover statutes
actually experienced a decline in market shares.6 Moreover, a limited model of decision-
making in which firms either stay in their headquarter states or move to Delaware may fail
to identify the preferences of the average firm that chooses to incorporate in Delaware. Ac-
cordingly, in order to estimate the direction and intensity of firms’ preferences, our study
5This type of inertia is also consistent with behavioral preferences towards the status quo,
anchoring effects and herd behavior that militate towards inertia (see Kahan & Klausner, 1997).
6The problem appears to be that Bebchuk & Cohen (2003) do not include state fixed effects in
their logit regressions. Therefore, their study fails to account for unobservable state factors and
the impact of legal changes on firms’ decision-making. In replicating their results with state fixed
effects, the coefficient on anti-takeover statutes is negative and statistically significant (see section
5.3 of the Online Appendix).
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incorporates the full menu of options available to different firms across time.
Furthermore, unlike most studies that focus only on anti-takeover statutes, this study
takes into account laws that protect managers from liability. States vary in the level of
liability protection they afford to directors and officers. Although Delaware was one of the
first states to enact a provision that allowed firms to exempt their directors from liability for
the duty of care (Romano, 1985; Moodie, 2004), other states have taken a more protectionist
approach by permitting exemptions from liability for the duty of loyalty. As stated above,
there is evidence that states, such as Delaware and Nevada, have attracted incorporations
by expanding the exemptions available to managers for violations of fiduciary duties.7 Ac-
cordingly, we construct a new index of liability protection that measures the extent to which
firms are allowed to exempt directors and officers from liability and indemnify them for such
liability. In this respect, we are able to test the hypothesis that states, especially Nevada,
can increase their market shares by extending favorable protections to managers.
Our study goes further than existing studies in other important respects. Most existing
studies do not take into account how heterogeneity of firm characteristics, whether firm
size or ownership structure, affects firms’ preferences for different legal regimes. Barzuza
& Smith (2014) show descriptive evidence that Nevada firms tend to be relatively small
with low institutional shareholdings, and that Delaware’s firms tend to be larger and have
significant institutional ownership. Accordingly, it seems that large firms generally prefer
shareholder-friendly laws, while smaller firms prefer laws that protect managers. Moreover,
the preferences for or against protectionism may increase or decrease depending on the
takeover environment. The takeover environment may also affect preferences for liability
protections. There is research that shows that the risk of corporate litigation is larger when
takeovers take place (Romano, 1990; Krishnan et al., 2012; Cain & Davidoff, 2014), and
managers often seek insurance policies to address this risk (Fleischer & Sussman, 2015).
7In addition, many proxy statements of firms that reincorporate in another state expressly say
that the extent to which the new state’s law affords adequate protection to managers is one reason
for the reincorporation (Heron & Lewellen, 1998; Eldar, 2017).
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Our study estimates how firms’ preferences for different legal regimes interact with the level
of takeover activity.
Although this is not our primary endeavor, our article also contributes to a wide liter-
ature that shows that institutional shareholders have an impact on corporate governance
and mitigating agency costs. For example, there is evidence that institutions are instrumen-
tal in passing shareholder proposals (Gillian & Starks, 2000), and that they exercise power
over management behind the scenes through the threat of exit (McCahery et al., 2015).
There is also recent anecdotal evidence that activist investors require firms to reincorporate
in Delaware as part of the pressure they place on boards to improve corporate governance
(Bloomberg, 2017; Chiu, 2017). Our results with respect to the preferences of firms with
high institutional shareholding are robust to specifications that include instrumental vari-
ables; specifically, following Aghion et al. (2013), we use inclusion in the S&P index as an
instrument for institutional shareholding. This suggests that institutional shareholding has
a causal effect on the choice of corporate governance laws.
Finally, from a policy perspective, our findings are critical for assessing the desirability
of regulatory competition. In particular, they cast doubt on the notion that Delaware’s
dominance is guaranteed due to the lack of any meaningful competition, or that regulatory
competition creates pressure on Delaware to cater to the needs of managers at the expense of
shareholders. Rather, they suggest that the outcomes of competition are primarily shaped
by shareholders’ interests (Romano, 2017). Although we do not examine in this article
whether firms’ choices enhance shareholder value, our findings fit well with evidence that
Delaware incorporation is associated with positive abnormal returns (Romano, 1985; Heron
& Lewellen, 1998; Bhagat & Romano, 2002) and higher Tobin’s Q (Daines, 2001, Eldar,
2017).8 Moreover, Eldar (2017) shows that even Nevada incorporations may increase share-
holder value for the type of firms that self-select into Nevada, that is, small firms with low
institutional shareholding. Therefore, there is little evidence that regulatory competition
8While the association with Tobin’s Q has been contested by other studies (Subramanian, 2004;
Cremers & Sepe, 2014), it holds true in the sample that we examine in this article (Eldar, 2017).
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harms shareholder value.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data we use for this research.
Section 3 lays out our choice model, compares it to other models of inertia, and explains our
identification strategy. Section 4 discusses our main results. Section 5 evaluates different
counterfactuals, in particular, the extent to which Delaware would lose market share if it
adopted protectionist laws. Section 6 validates our results by showing in-sample and out-
of-sample predictions. Section 7 carries out several robustness tests. Section 8 discusses the
implications for the policy debates surrounding corporate law.
2 Data
2.1 State of Incorporation and Firm Characteristics
To identify firms’ responses to legal changes in a panel set-up, we need to obtain accurate
data on incorporations and reincorporations for every firm-year observation. As described
in section 1 of the Online Appendix, we construct a novel data set of firm incorporations
by parsing the states of incorporation from over two million public disclosure documents
available on SEC servers from 1994 to 2013. To our knowledge, this is the first database that
correctly identifies the state of incorporation over time for largely all public firms active in
the period of interest. We match the incorporation data to accounting data from Compustat,
and data on institutional shareholding and managerial ownership from Thomson Reuters.9
The database has 89,926 firm-year observations from 11,222 firms in the years 1994-2013.
Because of the initial condition problem associated with using the first year in our inertia
model, we use data from 1995. Similar to Daines (2001) and Subramanian (2004), we exclude
all utility and financial firms because the corporate governance of such firms differs as a result
of significant federal regulation.
9Thomson Reuters data on institutional shareholdings is sourced from 13F filings. Thomson
Reuters data on managerial ownership is sourced from Forms 3, 4, and 5 filings, using the same
method as Panousi & Papanikolaou (2012).
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Trends in the market shares of key states are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Delaware’s
share is about 64.15% as of 2013, as compared with 50.57% in 1995. Delaware’s market share
of firms whose headquarters are located in a state which is not their state of incorporation
(“out-of-state incorporations”) is even larger: 81.28% as of 2013, as compared with 82.85%
in 1995. The most noticeable trend over time is the increase in Nevada’s market share of
all incorporations from 2.29% in 1995 to 10.43% in 2013, and of out-of-state incorporations
from 2.83% to 11.61%.
While Delaware and Nevada are the most popular states of incorporation, a large number
of corporations incorporate in the state of their headquarters (28.84% of firm-year observa-
tions). We observe 602 reincorporations, with 588 firms reincorporating at least once. 399
of these reincorporations are into Delaware directly, and 79 are to Nevada. Finally, we
drop firms with fewer than three firm-year observations. The final sample includes 81,993
firm-year observations and 8,769 firms.
Table 1 compares the characteristics of Delaware and Nevada firms. Firms incorporated
in Delaware are similar to the average firm in the sample in terms of size ($2.04 billion in as-
sets as compared to $1.95 billion for the average firm) and institutional shareholding (39.26%
as compared to 34.98% for the average firm). Nevada firms are significantly smaller with
an average of $360.04 million in assets and relatively low average institutional ownership
of 10.16%. Nevada firms also have a higher percentage of managerial ownership (approxi-
mately 6%) as compared to Delaware (approximately 4.27%).10 As depicted in Figures 3-5,
the increase in Nevada’s market share is mostly due to small firms with low institutional
shareholding and high insider ownership.
10Our figures of managerial ownership are generally consistent with the statistics depicted by
Barzuza & Smith (2014). However, we note that the data from Thomson Reuters Forms 3,4 and
5, does not appear to be accurate and can only be used as a proxy.
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2.2 Laws’ Characteristics and the Takeover Environment
In this section we introduce the indices for states’ legal characteristics, focusing on anti-
takeover laws and managerial liability protections. We discuss the construction of these
indices in greater detail in section 2 of the Online Appendix. We emphasize that it is
not necessary for the main claims in our article to show that states’ corporate laws are
consequential (for example, that anti-takeover statutes actually decrease the likelihood of
takeovers). In section 3 of the Online Appendix we show some evidence that corporate laws
are consequential. However, for our purposes, the critical issue is whether firms view these
laws as consequential and take them into account in making incorporation decisions (see
Bebchuk & Cohen, 2003).
2.2.1 Anti-takeover laws
Anti-takeover laws are laws that make takeovers difficult for bidders. In our main spec-
ification, we rely on the anti-takeover index developed by Bebchuk & Cohen (2003) that
counts the number of anti-takeover statutes in each state. This index has been used in most
studies of the demand for corporate law (e.g., Subramanian, 2002; Kahan, 2006; Broughman
et al., 2014). Each state gets a score from 0 to 5 if it has one or more of the following
statutes: constituency provisions, business combination statutes, control share statutes, fair
price statutes, and poison pill validation laws. The definition of each of these laws can be
found in Table A3 of the Online Appendix. We document the ATS index score for each state
year in our database, using the year in which the statutes were passed.
The ATS index has been criticized on the basis that most of the anti-takeover statutes are
inconsequential in delaying or preventing takeovers. The reason is that boards are always
in a position to adopt a poison pill, which is widely regarded as the most effective anti-
takeover device, and once a company has a poison pill in place, other anti-takeover devices
become superfluous (Coates, 2000; Kahan, 2006, Catan & Kahan, 2016). Accordingly, as an
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alternative specification, we use a dummy for poison pill validation statutes. The essence
of these statutes is that they protect standard poison pills from judicial review. Under
Delaware law, poison pills are generally permitted, but they can be challenged in courts if
they do not satisfy certain legal tests under the Unocal and Revlon decisions. Briefly stated,
under Unocal, managers must be able to show that there is a threat to their firm’s policy
and that the defensive measure in question is proportional to the threat posed. Under the
Revlon decision, if a sale or break-up of the company is inevitable, the board is obligated to
pick the highest bid for shareholders. This level of scrutiny does not generally apply when a
state has a poison pill statute (Barzuza, 2009).
We also add variables that account for extreme forms of anti-takeover protection. First,
we use a dummy, Dead Hand, for states that have statutes (i.e., Maryland and Virginia)
or case law (i.e., Pennsylvania and Georgia) that validate dead hand pills. Dead hand pills
are extreme forms of pills which cannot be removed by conducting a proxy fight to replace
the board with a new board that will redeem the pill. We also use a dummy, Extreme,
which is identical to Dead Hand, except that it is set to one for states that have laws that
impose staggered boards,11 or in the case of one state (Maryland) allow their adoption even
if contrary to the charter. This arguably represents an extreme form of takeover protection
because when a firm has a staggered board, replacing the board can take several years and
therefore a bid is more likely to fail (Cohen & Wang, 2013).
2.2.2 Director and Officer Protection
We construct a new index that measures the extent to which state laws protect directors
and officers from liability. Managers can be protected in three main ways: exemption from
liability, indemnification for liability out of the company’s funds, and insurance. Our index
focuses on exemption and indemnification because the laws of all states allow firms to insure
their directors and officers to largely the same extent. States’ laws relating to exemption
11Until recently, only Massachusetts had such a statutory provision. More recently Indiana
enacted such a law in 2009, Oklahoma in 2010 and Iowa in 2011.
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and indemnification differ substantially across states. Because the laws of many states in-
corporate different standards of liability protection for directors and officers, we construct
separate indices for directors (LP (DIR)) and for officers (LP (OFF)), as well as a combined
index, which simply aggregates the two (LP).
With respect to exemption, the statutes of many states allow firms to adopt a charter
provision that exempts directors and/or officers from liability for breaching their duty of
care. Duty of care is associated with a gross negligence standard, but is generally protected
by the business judgment rule, according to which, courts will not second-guess the business
judgment of corporate managers. Under section 102(b)(7) of Delaware General Corporation
Law, Delaware firms may exempt directors, but not officers, from the duty of care. Other
states, such as Maryland, also allow firms to exempt directors and/or officers from liability
for the duty of loyalty, as long as there has been no willful or intentional misconduct. The
duty of loyalty is broadly defined as the duty to act in good faith to advance the best interests
of the corporation (Strine et al., 2010). Accordingly, where states permit firms to exempt
managers from liability without requiring good faith, we classify those states as allowing
exemption from the duty of loyalty.
Finally, a few states also go further by exempting managers from liability for breaching
any fiduciary duty by default, rather than allowing firms to exempt managers through a
menu option (which is subject to shareholder approval). A default exemption is viewed as
stronger protection than a menu option because it is rare for firms to opt out of default
provisions, especially those that are favorable to managers (see Ayres, 1992; Romano, 1993;
Subramanian, 2002; Listokin, 2009). States’ legislatures may also use default rules as a signal
to firms and courts about the appropriate level of culpability managers ought to face. For
example, prior to 2001, Nevada allowed firms to exempt managers from the duty of loyalty
through a menu option, but in 2001, Nevada law was changed such that managers became
exempt from fiduciary duties by default. This change arguably accounts for the shift of firms
into Nevada (Barzuza, 2012).
13
In constructing the index, we rate each state’s exemption provisions as follows: We give 1
point if exemption from the duty of care is permitted; 2 points if exemption from the duties of
care and loyalty are permitted; and 3 points if managers are exempted from fiduciary duties
by default. We carry out a similar process with respect to permissible indemnification, which
typically relates to (a) third party lawsuits, and (b) corporate expenses in derivative suits.
We give 2 point if indemnification for violating the duties of care and loyalty are permitted,
and 1 point if only indemnification for breaching the duty of care is permitted.12 Virtually
all states’ indemnification provisions are embedded in menu options rather than default
laws; however, under some states’ laws, the board has sole discretion to indemnify managers
(including the directors), whereas other states require shareholder approval. We treat the
former as equivalent to default laws because they enable managers to protect themselves;
thus, when indemnification for liability for breaching both the duty of loyalty and care are
permitted without obtaining shareholder approval, we allocate 3 points.
In building each index, LP (DIR) and LP (OFF), we generally aggregate the exemption
and indemnification scores, such that the maximum score for each of LP (DIR) and LP
(OFF) is 6, and 12 for LP. However, when the exemption score is higher than the indemnifi-
cation score, we let the indemnification score be equal to the exemption score; the rationale
is that if the managers are exempted from liability, then indemnification becomes irrelevant.
As discussed below, our results are overall robust to different weighting of the exemption
and indemnification scores.
2.2.3 Summary
Thirteen states have enacted at least one anti-takeover statute between 1995-2013. One
fact that emerges from the ATS index is that Delaware has only one anti-takeover statute as
compared to the state average of 2.94 across time, whereas Nevada has five such provisions
12We create two separate scores for indemnification for (a) third party lawsuits and (b) cor-
porate expenses in derivative suits, and divide the total score by two, such that the maximum
indemnification score is three.
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(see Table 2). Thus, according to the ATS index, Delaware has a relatively pro-takeover
regime, whereas Nevada is relatively protectionist. We emphasize that the enactment of
poison pill statutes has been the most common legislative change concerning anti-takeover
devices between 1995-2013. By 1995, 25 states, including Nevada, had enacted a poison pill
statute, and by 2013, 35 had such a statute.
With respect to liability protections, Delaware and Nevada again stand out as two polar
opposite regimes (see Table 2). Whereas Delaware is one of the least protectionist states,
Nevada is ranked as the most protectionist. Delaware’s LP (DIR) score is 2 as compared to
6 for Nevada (since 2001), and an average score for all states across time of 2.91. The scores
for LP (OFF) are more divergent and highlight Nevada’s protectionist bent. Delaware’s 2013
score is 0.5, Nevada is the only state with a score of 6 (since 2001) and the average state
score across time is 1.45. Between 1995-2013, 11 and 13 states have increased the protection
offered to directors and officers respectively.
Finally, we emphasize that there is positive correlation among the ATS, LP (DIR) and LP
(OFF) indices (see Table 3). States seem to commit to packages of laws that are relatively
takeover-friendly, or to protectionist laws that appeal to managers. We do not observe for
example states that offer maximal protection on the LP (DIR) or LP (OFF) index and low
protection on the ATS index.13 There are, however, states that offer minimal protection on
the LP (OFF) index but have a high LP (DIR) and ATS scores.14 This probably reflects the
notion that anti-takeover statutes and liability protection for directors are viewed as more
acceptable than liability protection for officers who are engaged in the day-to-day operation
of the firm.
13All states that rank 6 on LP (DIR), namely Indiana, Nevada, Ohio and Wisconsin, also have
five anti-takeover statutes.
14Ohio and Indiana for example scores 5 and 6 on the ATS and LP (DIR) indices but only 0.5
and 1, respectively, on the LP (OFF) index.
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2.2.4 Interaction with Takeover Environment
In order to take into account changing economic conditions, we interact legal character-
istics with variables that measure takeover activity in the economy. We measure the level of
takeovers using data from SDC. We construct three measures: (a) the log of the number of
takeovers in the industry in the previous year, (b) the log of the dollar volume of takeovers
in the industry in the previous year (adjusted by the CPI to 2004 dollars), and (c) a dummy
that equals 1 if the four week average premium of takeovers in the industry in the previous
year is higher than the industry median. We use the industry median premium dummy
for the main specification because it enables us to assess firms’ preferences in response to
takeovers that increase shareholder value as opposed to how managers react to takeover
waves which may not be conducive to shareholder wealth. Table 4 shows summary statistics
with respect to the variables that measure takeover activity between 1995-2013.
3 Decision-Making under Rational Inertia
3.1 The Model
Before incorporating inertia into the model, we start with a standard multinomial choice
model in which firm i, in each year t, can incorporate in any state j. We assume that the
indirect utility of incorporation is :
ui,j,t =
∑
k
xkjt(βk +
∑
r
writγ
k
r ) + ξj + εijt, (1)
where xkjt is the k′th characteristics of state j at time t (e.g. the level of ATS or LP (DIR)
of Delaware in 2010); writ is the r′th characteristic of firm i (e.g., size) at time t; ξj is a state-
fixed effect, and εijt is a random utility shock known to the firm but not to the researcher.
We adopt the assumption that εijt is iid across firms, states and years, and is distributed
according to a type I extreme value distribution. The probability that firm i chooses to
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incorporate in state j at time t is then:
Pijt = Pr {uijt ≥ uikt, ∀k 6= j} ,
= e
δijt∑
h∈J eδiht
, (2)
where J is the set of all jurisdictions a firm can choose, and
δijt =
∑
k
xkjt(βk +
∑
r
writγ
k
r ) + ξj
is the nonrandom part of the utility of firm i from incorporating in state j at time t.
At this point, we introduce inertia to the model. In a model with inertia, firm i makes a
choice at time t, with probability piit. We assume that piit = 1 at time t1i , the first period in
which the firm is present in the data. Accordingly, the probability of choosing state j in the
first period is Pij1. In subsequent periods (i.e., t > t1i ), we need to adjust this probability by
taking inertia into account as follows:
P˜ijt =

piitPijt if j 6= j∗(i,t−1) & t > t1i
(1− piit) + piitPijt if j = j∗(i,t−1) & t > t1i
(3)
where j∗(i,t−1) denotes the state where the firm was incorporated in the previous period.
This modeling choice reflects the fact that the first period in which a firm appears in our
sample typically coincides with the time a firm becomes public. At that time, the firm has
to approach shareholders and consult with law firms about the firm’s legal documents, and
therefore the managers will consider the legal structure of the firm and will be presented with
various options by their lawyers. In these circumstances, the costs of attention or learning
are likely to be low. There is evidence that firms often reincorporate at the time of the initial
public offering (Romano, 1985; Daines, 2002). By contrast, reincorporations after the firm
becomes public are much less frequent, and occur only if the firm makes a choice and the
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choice is different than its state of incorporation in the previous year.
We model the probability of making a choice, piit, as arising from optimizing behavior. We
assume that firms (through their legal advisers) know the laws and their own characteristics,
but they do not know their own idiosyncratic shocks (εi·t). The firm chooses to learn this
shock, and potentially reincorporate, if the expected benefit from choosing exceeds some
costs cit, known to the firm but unobservable to the researcher. The expected benefit from
choosing is the expected utility of the best alternative law, given the laws of every state and
firm characteristics in time t. Accordingly, piit takes the form:
piit = Pr
{
E
[
max
j
uijt|δijt
]
− E
[
uij∗(i,t−1)t|δij∗(i,t−1)t
]
≥ cit
}
, (4)
and, as shown by McFadden (1981), our distributional assumptions imply that:
E
[
max
j
uijt|δijt
]
− E
[
uij∗(i,t−1)t|δij∗(i,t−1)t
]
= log
∑
h∈J
eδiht
− δij∗(i,t−1)t.
In this set-up, a firm is more likely to consider its state of incorporation if there is an
alternative law that would improve its utility by a sufficient amount. The firm (represented
by its managers and legal advisers) knows the law and its own characteristics. However,
without exerting some effort, the firm does not know more idiosyncratic factors (represented
by the random shock, εi·t) that could make a different legal system more attractive. Such
factors may include the likelihood that the firm will be subject to a takeover bid, legal hurdles
the current law of incorporation may pose for the transaction, and whether a different law
could facilitate the transaction (or future transactions). Similarly, the firm may need to
invest time and money to understand which laws might help its managers to focus on long-
term growth and avoid the need for dealing with disruptive bids and frivolous law suits.
We assume that cit is iid according to a logistic distribution with parameters (µ, σ) ,
so that we can use equations 3 and 4 to form the likelihood function of the data, and
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estimate parameters by maximum likelihood. In additional specifications, we further link cit
to the individual firm characteristics, such as size and institutional ownership. However, as
discussed in section 5.2 of the Online Appendix, the results are substantially the same as
the results in the main specification.
3.2 Identification
The major parameters are the coefficients on ATS, LP (DIR) and LP (OFF). These
coefficients are identified from the joint distribution of state characteristics, firm character-
istics and firm choices. There is substantial cross-sectional variation in legal rules in our
sample period, and to a lesser extent, also time-series variation. As discussed above, 13
states have enacted anti-takeover statutes. Likewise, 11 and 13 states have increased the
protection offered to directors and officers respectively. Even if legal rules do not experience
very frequent changes over time, firm characteristics and takeover activity provide us with
significant time-series variation. The average firm size measured by asset value increased
significantly over the years, as did ownership of institutional shareholders.
We further recognize, similar to Kahan (2006), that unobservable state-level character-
istics affect the incorporation decision. We add state fixed effects to control for factors that
we cannot observe in the data. These include network benefits, familiarity with the law and
quality of the courts. The fixed effects also absorb the impact of franchise taxes, i.e., the fees
that states charge for incorporation. We do not include franchise taxes as a variable mainly
because fees show virtually no variation over time, and secondarily because it is impossible
to determine each firm’s fees across time accurately.
Similar to Handel (2013), we identify firm preferences primarily from periods in which we
observe firms making initial incorporation decisions or changing their state of incorporation.
Note that firms need not reincorporate immediately in response to legal changes but may
do so several years afterwards due to inertia in decision-making. For example, a firm might
dislike a protectionist law, but not enough to shift to Delaware. If its characteristics change
19
in the next period (e.g., the percent of institutional ownership increases) it may decide that
its dislike for protectionist laws is sufficient to bear the costs of reincorporating. Parameters
of the distribution of the cost of choosing are identified mainly by the observed switching
patterns.
As in Sallee (2014) and Ho et al. (2017), inertial behavior in our model arises from the
probability of not choosing. This probability is related to the presence of better alternatives.
When states change the law or firm characteristics change, the firm’s utility from alternative
laws changes as well. As discussed above, the intuition is that when a favorable law is
introduced the firm is likely to be informed of its presence by its counsel or by lawyers that
seek to attract firms to the state, but it needs to pay a cost to learn the quality of the fit
between the law and the firm’s business needs. Following Heckman (1981), inertial behavior is
typically modeled as arising from structural state dependence (whereby past choices directly
influence preferences) or spurious state dependence (in which the persistence in behavior is
due to persistence in unobservables).15 Such approaches, however, are not well suited for
reincorporation decisions.
The standard way to account for structural state dependence is to introduce switching
costs. A flexible non-parametric model with switching costs cannot be identified given the
limited variation in the data, particularly the small number of reincorporations (less than 5%
of firm-year observations). A simpler model where switching costs are constant, irrespective
of the origin and destination states, characteristics of the laws, and firm characteristics, is
overly restrictive. Moreover, as shown in section 4 of the Online Appendix, such a model
would fit our data poorly, and overestimate the costs of switching, which virtually all legal
commentators consider to be relatively low (e.g., Black, 1990).
Spurious state dependence could in theory be modeled by including random effects that
account for time-invariant idiosyncratic preferences for states of incorporation. In such a
model, firms tend to select a state for which they have a high persistent shock at the time
15For examples, see Shum (2004) or Dubé et al. (2010).
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of first incorporation. Even if they reincorporate elsewhere at a later time (driven by either
a high random shock, or a change in characteristics), the persistence of state-specific shocks
implies that they are likely to go back to their original choice. However, firms that reincor-
porate into another state rarely go back to their former state of incorporation in our data.
Rather, they virtually always stay in the new state of incorporation throughout the life of
the firm. Accordingly, random effect models do not adequately capture the inertia in this
particular set-up.
4 Results
Our main results are depicted in Table 5. First, we find several factors that make the
market for corporate laws relatively static and reduce the likelihood of reincorporations and
market shifts. A salient factor in firms’ incorporation decisions is indeed the fixed effect of
each state. Most conspicuously, Delaware’s fixed effect, which amounts to 7-8 units of utility
(as defined in equation 1) under different specifications, is substantially larger than the fixed
effects of other states. This finding is consistent with the notion that unobservable elements
of Delaware law, such as the quality of its judiciary, its responsiveness to business needs,
and network benefits, are all primary drivers for incorporating in Delaware. Interestingly,
Nevada’s fixed effect is also fairly substantial and amounts to 4-5. While Nevada is not
known for having a high quality judicial system, Nevada has long tried to attract market
share from Delaware (Cary, 1974), and its legislature has been accordingly responsive to
business needs, especially the interests of firms’ management (Barzuza, 2012). In contrast,
states such as California and New York have a low fixed effect, confirming the general view
that their legal systems are not adequate for addressing the needs of modern firms.
Second, consistent with past studies, firms also manifest a marked preference for incor-
porating in the state where they are located. The coefficient on Home Bias, a dummy equal
to 1 if a firm is incorporated in the state in which it is headquartered, is about 4.44.
Third, as expected, we find that inertia plays a significant role in firms’ incorporation
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decisions. Using the parameter estimates of the distribution of the costs of choosing, we can
compute the average probability of making an incorporation choice. That average probability
is about 1.2% across specifications, which translates into roughly 20% probability of making
one incorporation decision (and potentially, reincorporation) over 20 years.
Our main findings however relate to legal characteristics. Although unobservable fixed
effects, home-bias and inertia, significantly affect firms’ incorporation decisions, the effects
of states’ laws are not trivial. We consider counterfactuals in section 5 in greater detail to
explain the potential market shifts that legal changes could cause, but for present purposes
we focus on the key findings.
First, firms generally dislike anti-takeover statutes. This dislike is strong across different
types of firms, and includes large, medium and small firms. This finding casts doubt on
the hypothesis that anti-takeover laws enable states to increase their market share of firm
incorporations. In addition, as shown in column (2) of Table 5, the dislike for anti-takeover
statutes is stronger when the average industry takeover premium is above the median. We
also examine the preferences of firms with high managerial ownership. As shown in column
(3), firms with managerial ownership of at least 15 percent of the stocks dislike anti-takeover
statutes less. This suggests that managers generally prefer laws that benefit them. However,
this result does not hold when the threshold for managerial ownership is 25 percent.16
Second, unlike anti-takeover statutes, firms seem to prefer some level of protection for
their directors and officers. Large firms with high institutional shareholdings actually prefer
a relatively high level of director protection (though many of the coefficients on LP (DIR)
and size interactions with LP (DIR) are not statistically significant). However, they dislike
liability protection for officers, where the coefficients are about -0.37. In contrast, small firms
with low institutional shareholding like high protection for their officers (the coefficients are
16The reason might be that managers with very high managerial ownership do not care about anti-
takeover statutes since they have control over whether the firm will be acquired or not irrespective
of the legal regime. On the other hand, it is important to mention again that data on managerial
ownership is noisy, and therefore there are relatively few firms that have more than 25 percent
managerial ownership based on forms 3,4 and 5.
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about 0.32). Directors in large firms may be particularly concerned about potential lawsuits
and liabilities. This result is consistent with studies that show that large firms are more
likely to face litigation (Brochet & Srinivasan, 2014). Preference for LP (DIR) also rises
when takeover premiums are high, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. On
the other hand, small firms where the directors typically also serve as officers are especially
interested in liability protection for officers. Thus, the LP (OFF) index seems to be the
primary driver for incorporations in Nevada rather than the LP (DIR) index. We do not
find that managerial ownership significantly affects preferences for liability protections. The
coefficient on the interaction of LP (DIR) with managerial ownership is slightly negative
and insignificant. The coefficient on LP (OFF) and officers’ ownership is positive but not
statistically significant.
In section 5.1 and Table A9 of the Online Appendix, we also report results using the
combined LP index. The results are largely the same, showing that most firms like liabil-
ity protection, and that this preference is substantially stronger for small firms with low
institutional shareholding.
We note that we do not find evidence that home bias is driven primarily by large firms
that exert influence on local regulators. In fact, the home bias for larger firms is smaller
than that of smaller firms. One explanation may be that large firms tend to hire national
law firms, and such firms presumably advise them to incorporate in Delaware, whereas small
firms tend to consult local law firms. While some large firms no doubt exert influence on
local legislatures, the average large firm is less inclined to incorporate in its home state.
Finally, in unreported regressions we find that the coefficient on an interaction term
between Home Bias and ATS is positive, but relatively small compared to the coefficient on
Home Bias. Thus, consistent with Bebchuk & Cohen (2003), there is some evidence that
anti-takeover statutes increase states’ ability to retain firms in their jurisdictions, although
the results suggest that this occurs only at a small scale.
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5 Counterfactuals
In order to assess the elasticity of firms’ preferences in corporate law, we need to evaluate
the extent to which market shares of different states would change following changes to
states’ laws. We are particularly interested in several counterfactuals in which Delaware
becomes more protectionist. In the first counterfactual, we examine the market shift that
would occur if Delaware enacted four anti-takeover statutes in 2006 such that its ATS index
score were five (see Figure 6). We use all other state and firm characteristics to estimate
firm choices between 2007 and 2013, taking into account inertia in decision-making which
could delay firm reincorporations. We take a conservative view by not changing Delaware’s
fixed effect, so we assume that Delaware continues to enjoy a significant advantage over other
states irrespective of its laws.
The results show that despite inertia in decision-making, a sizable number of firms would
shift away from Delaware. The predicted decline in Delaware’s market share in the period
2006-2013 amounts to 11.08%, and the downward trend would continue if we were to iterate
the simulation beyond our sample period.17 Using back of the envelope calculations, the
revenue loss to Delaware from franchise taxes in 2013 would be approximately between $35
million and $70 million.18 Thus, although Delaware has substantial market power, if it
adopted laws that signal to the market that it does not view takeovers favorably, it would
lose significant market share. Despite Delaware’s large fixed effect, many firms would return
to their home states. California’s market share for example would increase from 2.66% to
3.40%.
Second, we consider changes to market shares if Delaware replicated Nevada and not
only enacted more anti-takeover statutes, but also increased the liability protection for both
17Note that without inertia Delaware’s market share in 2007 would decrease to less than 30%.
18The lower bound is based on the assumption that large firms in our sample pay the maximum
franchise fee, i.e., $180,000, medium firms pay $130,000, and small firms pay $10,000. The upper
bound is simply the product of the predicted decline in market shares (11.08%) and Delaware’s
revenue from franchise taxes in 2013 ($605.6 million).
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directors and officers (see Figure 7). The results suggest that Delaware would not lose much
market share. The reason is that Delaware could attract firms from Nevada due to its large
fixed effect. However, if we focus only on relatively large firms with more than $100 million
in assets that have more institutional shareholders, the results change dramatically. Such
firms would flee from Delaware mainly because they dislike anti-takeover statutes and strong
liability protections for officers.
Third, we note that as the coefficient on LP (DIR) in Table 5 is positive, our estimates
suggest that Delaware could gain some market share by increasing the protection it offers to
directors, but not to officers, and keep its anti-takeover regime intact. However, we do not
think that this scenario is very likely. We emphasize that the coefficient on LP (DIR) is not
statistically significant, and therefore there is uncertainty as to whether firms truly prefer
higher protection for their directors. Moreover, as discussed in section 2, there is a positive
correlation among our indices for protective or managerialist environments. The reason, we
submit, is that states’ commitments to shareholder-friendly or manager-friendly rules are
not made in isolation with respect to specific laws, but rather as packages of laws that either
tilt the balance of power in favor of shareholders or managers (particularly directors in the
context of large firms). We therefore consider the case whereby Delaware increases its ATS
to 5 and LP (DIR) to 6, while maintaining LP (OFF) at zero. The result is that Delaware
would keep roughly the same market share, as the gains from increasing LP (DIR) are offset
by the loss of increasing ATS (see Figure 8). Therefore, it seems that Delaware has limited
incentives to shift to a protectionist regime.
Finally, we also consider whether Nevada or any other state could compete with Delaware
by replicating Delaware’s law (see Figure 9). Our results indeed confirm the view that other
states cannot challenge Delaware by merely copying its statutory code (Bebchuk & Hamdani,
2002, Kahan & Kamar, 2002). In fact, as predicted by Barzuza (2012), if Nevada tried to
replicate Delaware it would lose significant market share. Nevada attracts incorporations
by differentiating itself from Delaware’s pro-shareholder regime, but cannot compete with
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Delaware for larger firms. Leaving Delaware’s institutional dominance intact, it is only if
Delaware retracted from its relatively pro-shareholder laws that other states could attract a
significant share of large firms.
6 Validation
In this section, we validate the results by showing that the coefficient estimates provide
reasonable predictions of states’ market shares.
We use the rational inertia model to simulate firms’ incorporation choices, and compute
states’ market shares of incorporations by aggregating individual firms’ decisions. In Figure
10, we show the in-sample predictions of the market shares of Delaware and Nevada over
the period of our data. While no model can predict market shares perfectly, our model does
reasonably well. We use the model in column (2) of Table 5 for the validation exercises, but
other specifications yield similar results. We focus on predicting changes in states’ market
shares of incorporations following changes to state laws, especially the recent rise of Nevada’s
market share. As Figure 10 shows, our model fits the rise of Nevada reasonably well. We
further examine the shift in market shares in four states that enacted anti-takeover statutes,
namely Texas, Missouri, Washington and Connecticut. We choose these states because
among the states that have enacted anti-takeover statutes, especially poison pill validation
statutes, they have the largest market share. The in-sample predictions are presented in
Figure 11, and they appear to be relatively accurate.
In-sample validation is only partial evidence that our model can predict market shares.
More importantly, the question is whether the model predicts market shares out-of-sample.
In particular, we focus on the market share of Delaware and the increase in Nevada’s market
share in the 2000s. We estimate the model using the data up to and including 2008, and
then predict market shares for 2009-2013 for the firms in our sample. Figure 12 compares
the actual market shares of Delaware and Nevada and their predicted values between 2009
and 2013. We use the model in column (2) of Table 5 for the validation exercises, but again
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other models yield similar results. As shown in Figure 12, the predicted values of the inertia
model are reasonably close to the true market shares. For example, the predicted market
share of Delaware in 2013 is 62.15% as compared to the actual market share of 62.84%, and
the predicted market share of Nevada in 2013 is 8.42% as compared to the actual market
share of 9.81%. Accordingly, our model also provides a reasonable prediction of market
shares out-of-sample.
7 Robustness
In this section we discuss alternative specifications and present an instrumental variable
strategy to address concerns relating to the endogeneity of institutional ownership. Ad-
ditional robustness tests are reported and discussed in section 5 of the Online Appendix,
including the following: (1) specifications with a combined LP index, (2) an alternative
model of the probability of choice, and (3) specifications without state fixed effects.
7.1 Alternative Specifications
Our results are robust to alternative ways of measuring legal characteristics. First, given
that most of the time variation in the ATS index derives from the adoption of poison pill
statutes, we run the model with a Pill Statute dummy instead of using the ATS index. The
results are available in Table 6. Interestingly, the coefficients on Pill Statute are negative
and relatively very large. In particular, large and medium firms that have a high percent-
age of institutional shareholders dislike pill statutes substantially more than smaller firms
(the coefficient is between -1.2 and -1.4). This dislike is larger when the industry takeover
premium is larger than the median.
Moreover, in column (2), we add the dummy variable, Dead Hand, for states that either
have a statute or case law that validates a dead hand poison pill. We consider this to be an
interaction term because all the states where dead hand pills have been validated have pill
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statutes. This is consistent with the view that a poison pill statute makes it more likely that
courts will uphold dead hand pills (Barzuza, 2009). The coefficient on this variable is largely
zero, but it becomes negative when interacted with the takeover premium dummy. Finally,
in column (3), we use the dummy variable, Extreme, instead of Dead Hand to also account
for states that have a statute that requires firms to adopt staggered board. The results are
again very similar. Note that the statistical insignificance of the coefficients on Dead Hand
and Extreme are not surprising given the limited cross-sectional and time-series variation in
the data with respect to these variables. Moreover, the coefficients on other variables are all
similar to those in Table 5. We also conduct tests where we take into account the standards
of review that each state has applied to the poison pill over time, following the analysis of
Barzuza (2009). Our results are robust to this specification, but for simplicity we do not
include them.
We further use other measures of takeover intensity instead of the average takeover pre-
mium in the industry. We use the log of the number of 100% completed takeovers in the
industry in the previous year, and the log of the adjusted dollar amount of 100% completed
takeovers in the industry in the previous year. The results are generally robust to these
alternative measures too. In particular, firms, especially large ones, dislike anti-takeover
statutes more when the number or volume of takeovers in the industry is higher.
Second, we use alternatives variables for measuring states’ director and officer liability
protections. The results are robust to the following specifications: (1) allocating 0.5 points
instead of 1 point for default laws that exempt managers from liability for breaches of the
duty of loyalty or allow firms to indemnify managers for such liability without shareholder
approval; (2) using a weighted score for both LP (DIR) and LP (OFF), where we give
the exemption score 1.5 or 2 times more weight than the indemnification score, instead of
assuming that the indemnification score is equal to the exemption score when the latter is
larger (as in our main specification); (3) using a dummy variable to proxy for the degree of
states’ managerial liability protection, where the dummy equals 1 only when a state exempts
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managers for breaches of the duty of loyalty by default and/or allows for indemnification
in such circumstances without shareholder approval;19 and (4) using a modified version of
LP (DIR) and LP (OFF) that takes into account provisions that allow firms to indemnify
directors and officers for settlement or liability amounts in derivative suits.20 We do not
report the results obtained using these modified variables, but our findings are unaffected.
7.2 Instrumental Variable for Institutional Investors
While it is possible that firm characteristics, primarily institutional shareholding, may
be correlated with unobserved firm specific variables, this type of endogeneity is not likely
to present a serious concern for our findings. Our findings that firms with high institutional
shareholdings dislike protectionist laws support the bonding hypothesis, whether institu-
tional owners cause firms to choose shareholder-friendly laws or choose to invest in firms
incorporated in jurisdictions with such laws. More importantly, our counterfactuals relate to
legal changes rather than changes in firm characteristics, and therefore endogeneity concerns
do not materially affect the counterfactuals. Moreover, since we do not heavily rely on a
causal interpretation of the correlation between firms’ choices and institutional sharehold-
ing, this variable may be viewed as a proxy that accounts for unobserved market-orientation,
such as a desire to be acquired or retaining a national law firm.
In any event, we show that our results are robust when using inclusion in the S&P index as
an instrument for institutional shareholding (following Aghion et al., 2013). Inclusion in the
S&P 500 index is plausibly exogenous because it does not depend on a firm’s governance and
performance, but rather on whether a firm is deemed representative of its industrial sector.
19We employ two main alternative specifications: (a) a dummy that equals 1 only if a state
exempts managers from the duty of loyalty by default; and (b) a dummy that equals 1 not only
if there is such an exemption, but also when a state allows firms to indemnify managers for such
liability without shareholder approval.
20The indemnification score is either (a) an average of the indemnification score for direct suits,
corporate expenses in derivative suits and the settlement amounts in derivative suits, or (b) a
weighted average whereby 50% of the score is based on the score in direct suits, 25% on corporate
expenses in derivative suits and 25% with respect to the settlement amounts.
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Moreover, inclusion in the S&P 500 is positively correlated with institutional ownership, as
fund managers are more likely to invest in stocks that are part of the index. This correlation
persists even when controlling for firm size.
We rely on a control function approach to implement the instrumental variable analysis
(Imbens & Newey, 2009; Blundell & Powell, 2004). In the first stage, we regress the endoge-
nous variable on exogenous firm characteristics and instruments. We assume that the error
term in the first stage, νjt, and εijt, i.e., the error terms in each firm’s utility function (i.e.,
uijt in equation 1) are jointly independent of the exogenous variables and instruments, such
that , εijt is independent of institutional ownership conditional on νit. We estimate the first
stage with OLS, and include the estimated residuals νˆit in the specification of uijt. Following
Petrin & Train (2010), we impose the parametric assumption that the distribution of εijt
conditional on the realizations of νit is iid type I extreme value, and then estimate the model
with maximum likelihood estimation as in our main specification.
The results of the instrumental variable analysis in Table 7 suggest that the preferences
of firms with high institutional shareholding for certain legal regimes are even stronger than
those in our main specification. For example, firms with high institutional shareholding
dislike anti-takeover statutes (column (1)). This dislike is even stronger when we use Pill
Statute dummy instead of using the ATS index (column (2)); this is consistent with accounts
that institutions tend to object to poison pill provisions in the charter (Gillan & Starks, 2000;
Kahan & Rock, 2014). Similarly, as in the main specification, institutional shareholding is
associated with higher LP (DIR) and lower LP (OFF), but the magnitudes are larger. In
fact, when using instruments for institutional shareholding, the size of the firm does not
appear to be correlated at a statistically significant level with preferences for legal regimes,
and institutional shareholding seems to be the critical factor. This suggests that institutional
shareholding has a causal effect on the choice of corporate governance laws.
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8 Discussion of Results
8.1 Is there Competition for Corporate Law?
The central finding of this study is that Delaware faces competitive pressure to adopt
laws that are relatively more shareholder friendly than those of other states. If Delaware
aggressively sought to favor managerial interests it would lose revenue and market share,
especially among large firms. To be sure, our empirical strategy confirms many of the claims
of influential writers on competition for corporate charters, including the ideas that (a)
Delaware’s power is derived from unobservable quality, network externalities and familiarity
with the law; (b) firms exhibit strong home bias in incorporation decisions; (c) firms’ incor-
poration decisions tend to be sticky due to inertia in decision-making; (d) it is impossible
to compete with Delaware merely by copying its statutory code. However, if managerial
favoritism were a main driving force in this market, we would find that firms prefer strong
anti-takeover protections as well as laws that protect officers from liability, but nonetheless
choose to incorporate in Delaware because of its strong fixed effect. In contrast, we find that
states that have increased the level of their takeover protection lost market share over the
time frame that we examined.
We emphasize that we do not argue that states actively and vigorously compete for
incorporations. Thus, the insight by Kahan & Kamar (2002) that states’ bureaucracies
are not profit maximizing and face political obstacles in seeking to attract outside firms is
consistent with our findings. Similarly, network externalities and investment in institutional
infrastructure make it difficult to compete with Delaware (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2002). In
such circumstances, states might prefer to cater to the interests of the managers of local
corporations by enacting laws that enable those managers to resist the influence of outside
investors. Our results, however, indicate that the average effect of such policies is not to
attract market share, but in fact to reduce it.
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The emerging equilibrium that we observe is one of market differentiation (Barzuza, 2009;
Gilson et al., 2013). Delaware offers market-oriented laws that are relatively favorable to
shareholders, while the laws of most of other states cater primarily to local interests, such
as those of employees and local merchants. Within this equilibrium, a third alternative has
emerged for small firms that presumably have limited local influence, but seek a system that
is responsive to the needs of small firms with high insider ownership and strong managers.
The regulatory framework of corporate law in the United States may be viewed as a system of
complementary laws that provide for the needs of different forms of business, and in particular
large public firms that seek capital from widely dispersed shareholders and institutions.
Finally, we do not argue that Delaware pursues policies that are dismissive of managerial
interests, nor that Delaware would increase its market share if it further curtailed the interests
of firms’ managers, for example by barring classified boards or poison pills. We only argue
that in relative terms, Delaware has committed to a regime that is relatively more sensitive
to the preferences of shareholders.
8.2 Shareholder Value
Whether competition for corporate governance laws is welfare enhancing depends on
whether firms’ choices are conducive to shareholder value. As shown by Daines (2001), Litvak
(2013) and Barzuza & Smith (2014), incorporation in Delaware is correlated with higher
Tobin’s Q. While some have contested this finding (e.g., Subramanian, 2004), the results
hold in the sample used in this study (Eldar, 2017). Moreover, largely all event studies have
shown that incorporation in Delaware is associated with positive, albeit small, abnormal
returns (Bhagat & Romano, 2002). Consistent with our findings, the main explanation
for this is that Delaware incorporation facilitates takeover activity (Romano, 1985; Daines,
2001).
Nonetheless, there remains a possibility that Nevada’s protectionist laws are value de-
creasing. However, most studies have shown that incorporation in Nevada is correlated with
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higher Tobin’s Q (Litvak, 2014; Eldar, 2017). Eldar (2017) shows that this correlation is
limited to small firms with less than $100 million in assets. But, since most Nevada corpo-
rations are small the result suggests that firms that choose to incorporate in Nevada tend
to be those firms for whom Nevada incorporation is value enhancing. Eldar (2016) further
conducts an event study of firm incorporation in Nevada between 1996-2013 and finds that
such incorporations are associated with positive abnormal returns, although the effect is not
usually statistically significant. One explanation for the positive effect of Nevada law is that
it reduces the costs of corporate governance through takeovers and litigation for small firms
with a high percentage of insider ownership (Kobayashi & Ribstein, 2012; Eldar, 2017).
Taken together, these findings suggest that the system of regulatory competition induces
different types of firms to sort themselves into corporate governance systems that overall
benefit their shareholders.
8.3 Policy Implications
The broader policy question is whether there is a need for federal regulation. This
question echoes similar issues of harmonization versus competition in regulation that are
present in other markets, such as financial services (White, 1996). Some scholars argue
that takeovers should be federally regulated. Bebchuk & Ferrell (2001) advocate federal
rules that would effectively prohibit the use of most defensive tactics utilized after a bid is
made. Barzuza (2009) argues that federal regulation should impose a minimum standard
for judicial review of poison pills and anti-takeover devices. To be sure, Delaware law may
indeed be imperfect. For example, Delaware’s adoption of a business combination statute in
1988 seems like a redundant policy (Romano, 1987). However, it is highly doubtful that the
federal government would do better than Delaware.
The key problem with proposals for federal regulation is that they are based on a question-
able empirical premise, which is that Delaware’s pro-shareholder approach is due exclusively
to fear of federal intervention and that firms as a whole tend to choose laws that favor man-
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agerial interests. Our findings suggest that this premise is not founded in the data. Rather,
Delaware faces pressure from the demand side to enact laws that facilitate takeovers relative
to other states, even if imperfectly. In contrast, a federal regulator may be subject to the
politics of other interest groups not well versed with business needs and pursue populist poli-
cies that do not necessarily benefit shareholders. Criticism of recent federal regulation, such
as Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, are a case in point (Romano, 2005; Romano, 2014).
Finally, federal regulation could impose a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate gover-
nance on all firms. But the evidence suggests that there is scope for regulatory diversity.
Even if laws that delay or prevent takeovers are on average value decreasing, firms may ben-
efit from such laws in particular circumstances. Accordingly, there seems to be little reason
to impose uniform laws through federal regulation.
9 Conclusion
We develop in this article a model of firm choice of corporate laws under rational inertia.
We show that such a model can generate critical insights for the debate over the desirability
of regulatory competition in the market for corporate laws. While elasticity in the demand
for corporate laws is limited by unobservable quality, home bias, and inertia in decision-
making, there is evidence that corporate law does matter and can generate market shifts in
firm incorporation decisions. In particular, we find that Delaware faces competitive pres-
sures to adopt corporate laws that are relatively shareholder-friendly. Consistent with the
bonding hypothesis, our counterfactual analysis indicates that if Delaware enacted highly
protectionist laws, large public firms would leave Delaware. While such a scenario is unlikely
to transpire at present, it would be similar to events that led to the fall of New Jersey as
the dominant state of incorporation for U.S. firms in the early twentieth century (Butler,
1985). The enactment of protectionist anti-trust laws by the New Jersey legislature triggered
a mass migration of companies to Delaware, which copied New Jersey’s corporate code and
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created the infrastructure for serving modern business corporations. Similarly, we show that
if Delaware enacted laws that harmed shareholders, other states have strong incentives to
pick up the slack, especially small states that need new sources of revenues.21 Thus, even
if competition for corporate law is imperfect, it militates in favor of a corporate governance
regime that is conducive to shareholder interests.
21This observation is consistent with Baumol’s theory that incumbents are disciplined by the
threat of entry (Baumol, 1982; Romano, 2002).
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Figure 1: Market Shares of Delaware
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This figure shows the trends in the market share of Delaware between 1995
and 2013 among all firms and among firms that incorporate out of their home
state.
Figure 2: Market Shares of Nevada, California and New York
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This figure shows the trends in the market shares of Nevada, California and
New York between 1995 and 2013. In panel 1, the market share is computed
using all firms, and in panel 2, the market share is computed using only firms
that incorporate out of their home state.
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Figure 3: Market Shares of Delaware and Nevada for Small and Large Firms
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Delaware Nevada
This figure shows the trends in Delaware and Nevada market
shares between 1995 and 2013 among large and small firms. In
panel 1, the market share is computed using only firms with
less than $100 million in total assets. In panel 2, the market
share is computed using only firms with more than $1 billion
in total assets.
Figure 4: Market Shares of Firms with Low and High Institutional Ownership
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Delaware Nevada
This figure shows the trends in Delaware and Nevada market
shares between 1995 and 2013 among firms with high and
low institutional ownership. In panel 1, the market share is
computed using only firms with no institutional ownership. In
panel 2, the market share is computed using only firms with
at least 15% institutional owners.
Figure 5: Market Share of Firms with Low and High Managerial Ownership
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Delaware Nevada
This figure shows the trends in Delaware and Nevada market
shares between 1995 and 2013 among firms with high and low
managerial stock ownership. In panel 1, the market share
is computed using only firms with less than 15% managerial
ownership. In panel 2, the market share is computed using
only firms with at least 15% managerial ownership.
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Figure 6: Counterfactual 1 - Delaware Adopts Maximum ATS
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This figure compares Delaware’s simulated market share given the state and
firm characteristics observed in the sample to Delaware’s simulated market
share in the counterfactual scenario in which Delaware changes its laws in
2007 to increase the ATS index to its maximum level (i.e., ATS=5).
Figure 7: Counterfactual 2 - Delaware Adopts Maximum ATS, LP (DIR) and LP (OFF)
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Simulated Market Share
This figure compares Delaware’s simulated market share given the state and
firm characteristics observed in the sample to its simulated market share in
the counterfactual scenario in which Delaware changes its laws in 2007 to
increase the ATS, LP (DIR) and OFF indices to their maximum levels (i.e.,
ATS=5, LP (DIR)=6 and OFF=6). In panel 1, the market share is computed
using all firms in the sample. In panel 2, the market share is computed using
only firms with more than $100 million in total assets (i.e., medium and large
firms).
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Figure 8: Counterfactual 3 - Delaware Adopts Maximum ATS and LP (DIR)
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Simulated Market Share
This figure compares Delaware’s simulated market share given the state and
firm characteristics observed in the sample to its simulated market share in
the counterfactual scenario in which Delaware changes its laws in 2007 to
increase the ATS and LP (DIR) indices to their maximum levels (i.e., ATS=5
and LP (DIR)=6). In panel 1, the market share is computed using all firms
in the sample. In panel 2, the market share is computed using only firms with
more than $100 million in total assets (i.e., medium and large firms).
Figure 9: Counterfactual 4 - Nevada Adopts Delaware Law
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This figure compares Nevada’s simulated market share given the state and
firm characteristics observed in the sample to its simulated market share in
the counterfactual scenario in which Nevada changes its laws in 2007 such
that its ATS, LP (DIR) and LP (OFF) indices will have the same values as
those of Delaware law (i.e., ATS=1, LP (DIR)=2, and LP (OFF)=0.5).
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Figure 10: In-Sample Predictions - Delaware and Nevada
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This figure compares the actual market shares of Delaware and
Nevada and the in-sample predicted market shares of Delaware
and Nevada.
Figure 11: In-Sample Predictions
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Ma
rke
t S
ha
re 
(%)
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Year
Panel 1: Connecticut
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Ma
rke
t S
ha
re 
(%)
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Year
Panel 2: Missouri
0
.
5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Ma
rke
t S
ha
re 
(%)
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Year
Panel 3: Texas
0
.
5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Ma
rke
t S
ha
re 
(%)
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Year
Panel 4: Washington
Simulated In−Sample
Market Share in Data
This figure compares the actual market shares of Connecticut,
Missouri, Texas and Washington to their respective in-sample
predicted market shares.
Figure 12: Out-of-Sample Predictions
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This figure compares the actual market shares of Delaware and
Nevada and their predicted out-of-sample market shares for
the period 2009-2013. Predicted market shares are obtained
from estimating a model using the sample period 1995-2008.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max N
Panel A: All Firms
Total Assets ($ millions) 1,953.8 13,246.74 0 128.27 797,769 86,598
Sales ($ millions) 1,737.42 9,734.23 0 121.52 474,259 86,437
# of Employees (1000s) 7.17 36.3 0 0.6 2,200 84,097
Market Value ($ millions) 2,500.51 14,785.03 0 137.73 626,550.35 68,592
Institutional Ownership (%) 34.975 32.99 0 26.92 100 87,755
Managers Ownership > 15% 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 87,755
Directors Ownership > 15% 0.09 0.28 0 0 1 87,755
Officers Ownership > 15% 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 87,755
Panel B: Delaware Firms
Total Assets ($ millions) 2,038.55 10,317.37 0 180.16 304,594 51,467
Sales ($ millions) 1,857.36 9,946.1 0 160.76 474,259 51,389
# of Employees (1000s) 7.63 42.21 0 0.73 2,200 50,331
Market Value ($ millions) 2,500.22 11,855.19 0 209.07 376,370.28 41,372
Institutional Ownership (%) 39.26 33.45 0 34.57 100 52,034
Managers Ownership > 15% 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 52,034
Directors Ownership > 15% 0.07 0.26 0 0 1 52,034
Officers Ownership > 15% 0.06 0.23 0 0 1 52,034
Panel C: Nevada Firms
Total Assets ($ millions) 360.04 1,689.04 0 7.13 22,725.9 5,040
Sales ($ millions) 295.01 1,461.07 0 3.61 24,545.2 5,026
# of Employees (1000s) 1.88 8.95 0 0.03 125.95 4,613
Market Value ($ millions) 379.46 2,177.82 0 16.9 64,571.11 4,453
Institutional Ownership (%) 10.16 22.44 0 0 100 5,347
Managers Ownership > 15% 0.13 0.34 0 0 1 5,347
Directors Ownership > 15% 0.12 0.33 0 0 1 5,347
Officers Ownership > 15% 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 5,347
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Table 2: Summary of States’ Laws Indices
This table reports the scores for the ATS, LP (DIR) and LP (OFF)
indices for Delaware and Nevada in 2013 and the state
average between 1995-2013.
ATS Index LP (DIR) Index LP (OFF) Index
Delaware 1 2 0.5
Nevada 5 5.3 5.3
Average 2.94 2.91 1.45
Table 3: Correlation Table of States’ Laws Indices
This table reports the correlation matrix of the ATS, LP (DIR) and
LP (OFF) indices in the period 1995-2013.
ATS Index LP (DIR) Index LP (OFF) Index
ATS Index 1
LP (DIR) Index 0.386∗∗∗ 1
LP (OFF) Index 0.254∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 1
∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at a level p = 0.01.
Table 4: Annual Industry Takeover Data
This table reports summary statistics on takeover activity over the sample period
1995-2013, and across Fama French 49 industries. The “# Ind. Takeovers” refers to the
number of 100% completed takeovers in the industry. Data on industry takeovers values
are reported in billions of dollars. The four-week industry takeover premium is reported
in percentage points. All dollar figures are converted to 2004 values using the Consumer
Price Index. Source: SDC.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. N
# Ind. Takeovers 131.2 204.1 0 70 1568 836
Ind. Takeovers Value ($ billions) 14.066 29.834 0 4.48 422.048 836
Ind. 4-week Premium (%) 49.82 160.439 -97.33 31.38 2,982.803 827
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Table 5: Rational Inertia Model with LP (DIR) and LP (OFF) Indices
(1) (2) (3)
ATS -0.4448∗∗∗ -0.4076∗∗∗ -0.4097∗∗∗
(0.0744) (0.0962) (0.0962)
ATS × Small 0.0657 0.0678 0.0599
(0.0405) (0.0454) (0.0456)
ATS × Medium 0.0184 0.0207 0.0152
(0.0363) (0.0426) (0.0427)
ATS × Institutional Ownership -0.0453 -0.0459 -0.0458
(0.0411) (0.0429) (0.0431)
ATS × Industry Premiumt−1 > median -0.0690∗∗∗ -0.0692∗∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0224)
ATS × Manager > 15% 0.0611∗∗
(0.0310)
Average ATS -0.4260 -0.4349 -0.4366
- Small firms -0.3846 -0.3949 -0.3968
- Medium firms -0.4489 -0.4566 -0.4588
- Large firms -0.4741 -0.4819 -0.4826
LP (DIR) 0.4733 0.4417 0.4424
(0.5816) (0.4457) (0.4468)
LP (DIR) × Small -0.1356 ∗∗∗ -0.1373∗∗∗ -0.1353∗∗
(0.0482) (0.0644) (0.0646)
LP (DIR) × Medium -0.0604 -0.0632 -0.0613
(0.0434) (0.0568) (0.0569)
LP (DIR) × Institutional Ownership 0.1765 ∗∗∗ 0.1764∗∗∗ 0.1788∗∗∗
(0.0494) (0.0662) (0.0666)
LP (DIR)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0511 0.0508
(0.0372) (0.0373)
LP (DIR) × Director > 15% -0.0210
(0.0424)
Average LP (DIR) 0.4570 0.4588 0.4598
- Small firms 0.3592 0.3627 0.3628
- Medium firms 0.5007 0.5001 0.5027
- Large firms 0.5874 0.5888 0.5903
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(1) (2) (3)
LP (OFF) 0.1088 0.0861 0.0859
(0.2540 ) (0.4143) (0.4153)
LP (OFF)× Small 0.3106 ∗∗∗ 0.3079∗∗∗ 0.3037∗∗∗
(0.0477) (0.0514) (0.0516)
LP (OFF)× Medium 0.0641 0.0630 0.0609
(0.0537) (0.0524) (0.0526)
LP (OFF)× Institutional Ownership -0.7461 ∗∗∗ -0.7472∗∗∗ -0.7543∗∗∗
(0.0672) (0.0614) (0.0623)
LP (OFF)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0322 0.0330
(0.0290) (0.0290)
LP (OFF)× Officer > 15% 0.0425
(0.0335)
Average LP (OFF) -0.0042 -0.0067 -0.0087
- Small firms 0.3287 0.3261 0.3255
- Medium firms -0.1980 -0.2006 -0.2032
- Large firms -0.3734 -0.3760 -0.3796
Home Bias 4.4501∗∗∗ 4.4491∗∗∗ 4.4493∗∗∗
(0.0955) (0.1144) (0.1147)
Home Bias × Small 0.8378∗∗∗ 0.8338∗∗∗ 0.8385 ∗∗∗
(0.1029) (0.1153) (0.1156)
Home Bias × Medium 0.6276∗∗∗ 0.6289∗∗∗ 0.6307∗∗∗
(0.1084) (0.1192) (0.1194)
DE Fixed Effect 7.5986∗∗∗ 7.6022∗∗∗ 7.6041∗∗∗
(0.1862) (0.1910) (0.1914)
NV Fixed Effect 4.4581∗∗∗ 4.9323∗∗∗ 4.9281∗∗∗
(0.3995) (0.7944) (0.7953)
CA Fixed Effect 1.2141∗∗∗ 1.2130∗ 1.2144∗
(0.3678) (0.7286) (0.7306)
NY Fixed Effect 2.3451∗∗∗ 2.8315∗∗∗ 2.8346∗∗∗
(0.4706) (0.4014) (0.4020)
Average pi 1.2% 1.2% 1.2%
Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the rational inertia model.
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that indicates the state of incorporation. The
parameter estimates reflect the effect of one unit of each variable on the latent utility index of firms
in the sample. All variables not defined herewith are defined in the Appendix. The table reports in
bold firm utility with respect to one unit of each legal characteristic by firm size, given average firm
characteristics (i.e., institutional ownership and managerial ownership) and parameter estimates.
All specifications include state fixed effects, here reported for Delaware, Nevada, California and
New York. The average pi is the mean across firms-years of the probability that a firm makes
an incorporation choice in any given year, obtained according to the formula in equation 4. The
standard errors reported are computed using the Huber-White formula; see Train (2009). Firms
with less than three observations are not included. The number of firm-year observations is 81,993,
and there are 8,769 firms in the sample.
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Table 6: Rational Inertia Model with Poison Pill Statute Dummy
(1) (2) (3)
Pill Statute -0.7579∗∗∗ -0.7328∗∗∗ -0.7461∗∗∗
(0.1996) (0.2002) (0.2003)
Pill Statute× Small 0.6245∗∗∗ 0.6286∗∗∗ 0.6281∗∗∗
(0.1669) (0.1670) (0.1668)
Pill Statute× Medium -0.0283 -0.0278 -0.0285
(0.1656) (0.1656) (0.1655)
Pill Statute× Institutional Ownership -0.6806∗∗∗ -0.6826∗∗∗ -0.6802∗∗∗
(0.1461) (0.1462) (0.1462)
Pill Statute× Industry Premiumt−1 > median -0.2218∗∗∗ -0.2054∗∗∗ -0.1868∗∗∗
(0.0736) (0.0746) (0.0770)
Dead Hand -0.0198
(0.2615)
Dead Hand × Industry Premiumt−1 > median -0.2579
(0.2120)
Extreme -0.0347
(0.2162)
Extreme × Industry Premium > mediant−1 -0.2330
(0.1641)
Average Pill Statute Preference -0.8949 -0.8572 -0.8573
- Small firms -0.3756 -0.3348 -0.3350
- Medium firms -1.2751 -1.2393 -1.2395
- Large firms -1.3413 -1.3068 -1.3066
LP (DIR) 0.4857 0.4641 0.4682
(0.3669) (0.3648) (0.3630)
LP (DIR) × Small -0.2009∗∗∗ -0.2049∗∗∗ -0.2051∗∗∗
(0.0636) (0.0637) (0.0638)
LP (DIR) × Medium -0.0359 -0.0385 -0.0385
(0.0570) (0.0569) (0.0570)
LP (DIR) × Institutional Ownership 0.2799∗∗∗ 0.2796∗∗∗ 0.2789∗∗∗
(0.0653) (0.0653) (0.0657)
LP (DIR)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0454 0.0481 0.0432
(0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0363)
Average LP (DIR) 0.5182 0.4957 0.4961
- Small firms 0.3514 0.3278 0.3280
- Medium firms 0.6198 0.5972 0.5976
- Large firms 0.6960 0.6760 0.6764
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(1) (2) (3)
LP (OFF) 0.0992 0.1163 0.1156
(0.3361) (0.3303) (0.3288)
LP (OFF)× Small 0.3016∗∗∗ 0.3031∗∗∗ 0.3033∗∗∗
(0.0525) (0.0528) (0.0529)
LP (OFF)× Medium 0.0706 0.0722 0.0723
(0.0537) (0.0539) (0.0539)
LP (OFF)× Institutional Ownership -0.7322∗∗∗ -0.7346∗∗∗ -0.7344∗∗∗
(0.0621) (0.0626) (0.0627)
LP (OFF)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0198 0.0209 0.0204
(0.0292) (0.0294) (0.0295)
Average LP (OFF) 0.0033 0.0214 0.0206
- Small firms 0.3261 0.3450 0.3443
- Medium firms -0.1808 -0.1626 -0.1634
- Large firms -0.3612 -0.3451 -0.3459
Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the rational inertia model.
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that indicates the state of incorporation. The
parameter estimates reflect the effect of one unit of each variable on the latent utility index of firms
in the sample. All variables not defined herewith are defined in the Appendix. The table reports in
bold firm utility with respect to one unit of each legal characteristic by firm size, given average firm
characteristics (i.e., institutional ownership and managerial ownership) and parameter estimates.
Controls for Home Bias and states’ fixed effects are included but not reported. The standard errors
reported are computed using the Huber-White formula; see Train (2009). Firms with less than
three observations are not included. The number of firm-year observations is 81,993, and there are
8,769 firms in the sample.
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Table 7: Rational Inertia Model with IV for Institutional Shareholding
(1) (2)
ATS -0.2975∗∗∗ Pill Statute 0.0469
(0.1041) (0.4239)
ATS × Small -0.0129 Pill Statute× Small 0.0051
(0.0584) (0.3323)
ATS × Medium -0.0111 Pill Statute× Medium -0.2551
(0.0440) (0.1997)
ATS × Institutional Ownership -0.2124∗∗ Pill Statute× Institutional Ownership -1.9157∗∗∗
(0.0913) (0.5854)
ATS × Industry Premiumt−1 > median -0.0661∗∗∗ Pill Statute× Industry Premiumt−1 > median -0.2093
(0.0225) (0.1476)
LP (DIR) 0.2519 LP (DIR) 0.2312
(0.4416) (0.1687)
LP (DIR) × Small 0.0045 LP (DIR) × Small -0.0110
(0.0874) (0.0821)
LP (DIR) × Medium -0.0094 LP (DIR) × Medium 0.0309
(0.0596) (0.0494)
LP (DIR) × Institutional Ownership 0.4752∗∗∗ LP (DIR) × Institutional Ownership 0.6744∗∗∗
(0.1472) (0.1471)
LP (DIR)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0286 LP (DIR)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0270
(0.0374) (0.0350)
LP (OFF) 0.5871 LP (OFF) 0.5759∗∗∗
(0.4142) (0.1631)
LP (OFF)× Small -0.1163 LP (OFF)× Small -0.0966
(0.0773) (0.0785)
LP (OFF)× Medium -0.0962∗ LP (OFF)× Medium -0.0792
(0.0550) (0.0515)
LP (OFF)× Institutional Ownership -1.4930∗∗∗ LP (OFF)× Institutional Ownership -1.4290∗∗∗
(0.1299) (0.1331)
LP (OFF)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0695∗∗∗ LP (OFF)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0524∗
(0.0294) (0.0313)
Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table reports second stage maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the rational
inertia model using the control function to implement the instrumental variable analysis. In the
first stage (unreported), the endogenous variable, Institutional Shareholding, is regressed on the
instrument, a dummy that equals 1 if a firm is included in the S&P 500 index in the relevant year,
and the other exogenous variables. The dependent variable in the second stage is a categorical
variable that indicates the state of incorporation. The parameter estimates reflect the effect of
one unit of each variable on the latent utility index of firms in the sample. All variables not
defined herewith are defined in the Appendix. Controls for Home Bias and states’ fixed effects are
included but not reported. The standard errors reported are computed using formulas for two-steps
extremum estimators (Newey and McFadden, 1994). Firms with less than three observations are
not included. The number of firm-year observations is 81,993, and there are 8,769 firms in the
sample.
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Online Appendix to
“Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law”
Ofer Eldar∗ and Lorenzo Magnolfi†
This Online Appendix provides additional descriptions of the data, a detailed legal anal-
ysis of the legal indices and their construction, and robustness results. Section 1 describes
the data. Section 2 discusses in detail the legal indices. Section 3 contains a discussion of
the effects of corporate law. Section 4 compares the rational inertia model to alternative
models that do not include the inertia element. Section 5 presents several robustness tests,
including: (1) estimation results for a specification of our model that includes the combined
LP index; (2) an alternative specification of the probability of choosing that directly links
the costs of choosing to firm characteristics; and (3) specifications without fixed effects.
References to sections and tables refer to this Online Appendix unless it is stated that they
refer to sections or tables in the article.
1 Data on Firm Incorporations
In this section we describe the construction of the data on incorporations. The state of
incorporation is available on Compustat, but does not include historical data. Historical
data is available on two main databases: SEC Analytics and Compustat Point in Time.
However, each of these seems to have a large number of inaccuracies. SEC Analytics sources
the information directly from SEC documents available from 1994, but it extracts the state
of incorporation from the filing sheet rather than the document itself. The filing sheets are
not updated in a timely fashion - very often they are updated three to four years after the
actual reincorporation. For similar problems with SEC Analytics, see Heider & Ljungqvist
(2015). Compustat Point in Time includes observations that extend to 1990 and firms with
no public documents available on SEC Edgar website. However, this database appears to
have a sizable number of mistakes manifested by the presence of firms that supposedly
reincorporate several times within a short time frame; many of these mistakes cannot be
corrected when public documents are not available, especially before 1994. Barzuza &
∗Duke University. Email: eldar@law.duke.edu.
†University of Wisconsin-Madison. Email: lorenzo.magnolfi@yale.edu.
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Smith (2014) seem to address this problem by collecting data on reincorporations from
Mergent, but Mergent includes only data from 2000, and does not identify other mistakes
in Compustat that can only be detected by inspecting disclosure documents.
To address these problems, we create a new database by parsing data from over two
million public documents available on SEC Edgar website. The parsing program sources the
state of incorporation and the state of headquarters directly from the regular expressions on
10-Ks, 10-Qs and 8-Ks. In contrast to the filing sheets, the regular expressions are almost
invariably accurate. We merge the parsed data with firm level data from Compustat. We
further check manually (a) all firms where the parsing failed to identify the state from
the document, (b) firms that had more than one reincorporation on the basis of the parsed
data, and are therefore more likely to be mistakes, and (c) where there is a discrepancy with
Compustat data in the last year of the database (i.e., 2013) when Compustat is supposed
to be accurate. Finally, on sampling 200 reincorporations, we find no mistakes. Therefore,
we have reasonable assurance that the database is highly accurate.
Table A1 presents descriptive statistics with respect to each state’s market share of
incorporations in 2013, including (a) each state’s market share for all firms in the sample, (b)
each state’s market share for firms that incorporate out of the state where their headquarters
are located, and (c) each state’s retention rate, computed as the ratio of the number of locally
headquartered firms incorporated in the state to the number of firms headquartered in that
state. Although Delaware and Nevada are the most popular incorporation venues, almost
10% of the firms in the database (1,002 firms and 6,029 firm-year observations) choose at
some point to incorporate out-of-state, but not in Delaware or Nevada. Table A2 shows a
summary of the reincorporations we observe in our sample.
2 Laws’ Characteristics
2.1 Anti-takeover statutes
In our main specification, we rely on the anti-takeover statutes (“ATS”) index developed
by Bebchuk & Cohen (2003) that counts the number of anti-takeover statutes in each
state. Each state gets a score from 0 to 5 if it has one or more of the following statutes:
constituency provisions, business combination statutes, control share statutes, fair price
statutes, and poison pill validation laws. In Table A3 we describe the anti-takeover statutes,
which are included in the ATS index discussed in section 2.2.1 of the article. We note that
consistent with other studies, we do not include in the index idiosyncratic statutes that
impede takeovers1 or alternatively seek to facilitate them by placing restrictions on anti-
1For example, California’s Corporation Code prohibits a cash-out merger of minority shareholders
in a controlled corporation unless the controlling shareholder owns at least 90% of the shares,
2
takeover defenses.2
2.2 Alternative Measures of Anti-takeover laws
As an alternative measure of anti-takeover laws, we use a dummy variable for poison
pill statutes. The essence of such statutes is that they not only allow the board to adopt
a poison pill, but they also protect the pill from judicial review. To be sure, many states,
including Delaware, have case law that validates poison pills.3 However, Delaware, as well
as other states that follow it, subject the pill to some level of judicial scrutiny. In particular,
under the Unocal standard, a poison pill is valid only if managers can show that there is
a threat to their firm’s policy and that the defensive measure in question is proportional
to the threat posed.4 Moreover, under the Revlon decision, if a sale or break-up of the
company is inevitable, the board is obligated to pick the highest bid for shareholders.5 This
level of scrutiny does not generally apply when a state has a poison pill statute (Barzuza,
2009).
To be sure, there is disagreement as to whether the standard of review under Uno-
cal/Revlon remains significant following the Unitrin decision6, which held that a poison pill
was valid because the bidder’s chance of winning a proxy contest was not “mathematically
impossible” or realistically unattainable. Whereas some believe that the decision made poi-
son pills in Delaware largely immune to challenge (e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, 2014), others
argue that Delaware’s standard of review remains an important constraint on managerial
power to defend bids (e.g., Romano, 1993; Barzuza, 2009). The view that poison pill statutes
matter is also supported by an Oklahoma Supreme Court case which held that shareholders
of Oklahoma corporations may propose bylaws that restrict directors’ implementation of
poison pills, noting that had Oklahoma enacted a poison pill statute, it would have found
the proposed bylaw invalid.7
We note that the poison pill statutes of two states, New York and North Carolina,
validate the use of poison pills, but expressly subject them to judicial review. However,
North Carolina also has a statute that provides that courts will apply the business judgment
rule in reviewing anti-takeover tactics, including poison pills. New York has case law that
rejects the applicability of the Unocal/Revlon standards of review to standard defensive
the merger is approved by a California governmental agency, or shareholders approve the merger
unanimously. Cal. Corp. Code §§1101.
2See North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act, N.D. Cent. Code ch. 10-35 (2007), which
requires, inter alia, shareholder approval for the adoption of poison pills.
3Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
4Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
5Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.1986).
6Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (1989).
7See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999).
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tactics (see Barzuza, 2009). Accordingly, challenges to standard poison pills in these states
are not subject the standard of review which is applicable to Delaware corporations.
Although the poison pill is the most prominent anti-takeover device, it is not completely
fatal to a bid. In principle, the bidder may conduct a proxy fight to replace the incumbent
board before the pill threshold is triggered. This strategy, however, is unlikely to succeed in
two main circumstances. First, some states permit the use of an extreme form of poison pill
known as a “dead hand” pill. A dead hand pill cannot be redeemed even by a new board of
directors, thereby making the pill impossible to redeem by replacing the board. Two states,
Maryland and Virginia, have adopted poison pill statutes that validate dead hand poison
pills.8 Likewise, two states, Pennsylvania and Georgia, have case law that validates dead
hand pills.9 By contrast, Delaware courts take seriously any interference with shareholders’
voting rights in the context of defending a bid,10 and they have expressly rejected the
validity of dead hand pills under Delaware law.11
Accordingly, we use a dummy, Dead Hand, for states that have statutes or case law
that validate a dead hand pill. We view this as an interaction term because all states that
have validated a dead hand pill also have a poison pill statute. This is consistent with the
view that a poison pill statute makes it more likely that courts will uphold dead hand pills
(Barzuza, 2009).12
Second, if a firm has a staggered board, replacing the board can take several years
and therefore a bid is more likely to fail (Bebchuk et al., 2002). A staggered or classified
board is a practice in which a fraction (typically, one third) of the members of the board
of directors is elected each year instead of the entire board standing for election. When the
board is staggered, it could take more than a year before the bidder succeeds in replacing
the target board. All states, including Delaware, allow firms to adopt staggered boards.
However, a few states have adopted statutes requiring firms incorporated in the state to
have staggered boards. Until recently, only Massachusetts had such a statutory provision.13
8Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-405.1(d); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-727.1
9Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1580-81 (N.D.Ga. 1997); AMP
Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., No. CIV. A. 98-4405, CIV. A. 98-4058, CIV. A. 98-4109, 1998 WL
778348 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998).
10Pursuant to the Blasius case, managers may not use defensive tactics that interfere with share-
holder voting rights in elections of directors unless they can show a compelling justification; Blasius
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp. 564 A.2d 651 (Del.Ch. 1988).
11Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
12Other than Delaware, the only other state that has invalidated a dead hand pill is New York;
see Bank of N.Y. Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). Although
New York has a poison pill statute, as explained above, its statute subjects poison pills to judicial
review.
13Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 156D, § 8.06
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More recently Indiana enacted such a law in 2009,14 Oklahoma in 2010,15 and Iowa in
2011.16 In addition, one state, Maryland, allows the board to adopt a staggered board
even if contrary to the firm’s charter.17 While some of these statutes allow firms to opt
out the requirement to adopt staggered boards, as pointed out by Subramanian (2004),
firms rarely opt out of anti-takeover laws that benefit managers. Thus, these laws seem to
constitute a particularly strong form of anti-takeover statutes. Accordingly, to account for
these statutes, we also use a dummy, Extreme, which is identical to Dead Hand, except that
it is also set to one for states that have laws that impose staggered boards, or allow their
adoption even if contrary to the charter.
In comparing Delaware to Nevada, we find that Nevada’s laws are again more protective
than Delaware’s because Nevada has a poison pill statute. However, Nevada does not seem
to permit dead hand pills and does not impose staggered boards,18 and hence does not rank
as the most protectionist state in this respect.19
Finally, we also conduct tests where we take into account the standards of review that
each state has applied to the poison pill over time, following the analysis of Barzuza (2009).
Our results are robust to this specification, but for simplicity we do not include them. We
note, moreover, that the estimation with respect to Dead Hand and Extreme is likely to
be relatively noisy because there is little cross-sectional and time-series variation in these
variables.
2.3 Director and Officer Protection
Laws on exemption and indemnification differ along several dimensions. First, the stan-
dard of liability for which directors and officers can be exempted or indemnified differs from
one state to another (see DeMott, 1988). The statutes of Delaware and many other states
allow firms to exempt directors only if they acted in “good faith”.20 Some statutes, such
as Delaware’s, expressly prohibit firms from exempting directors from monetary liability
for breaching the duty of loyalty. In any case, the “good faith” requirement has been in-
terpreted to have this effect, and to allow exemption only from the duty of care (Romano,
14Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-33-6.
15Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1027
16Iowa Code § 490.806A
17Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 3-803.
18It is noteworthy though that Nevada allows firms to stagger their boards over a term of four
years, rather than three years. This arguably makes it harder to acquire control in Nevada firms;
see Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.330.
19Although Nevada has a a statute that imposes business judgment deference to anti-takeover
defenses, it does apply a proportionality standard (which is similar to the Unocal standard) to
tactics that interfere with shareholders’ voting rights; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.139(2).
20Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
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1990; Strine et al., 2010; Fleischer & Sussman, 2015). The duty of care requires managers
to act in the same manner as a reasonably prudent person in their position would. It is
generally associated with a gross negligence standard or sustained inattention. There are
very few cases where courts found directors or officers to be liable for breaching their duty
of care. The reason is that managers are protected by the business judgment rule, which
stands for the principle that courts will not second-guess the business judgment of corporate
managers and will find the duty of care has been met so long as the fiduciary executed a
reasonably informed, good faith, rational judgment without the presence of a conflict of
interest. Few states do not allow firms to exempt directors for liability even if they act in
good faith if there was gross negligence or unexcused inattention.21
On the other hand, other states, such as Maryland and Virginia, allow firms to exempt
directors even without good faith as long as there has been no willful or intentional mis-
conduct.22 This standard is generally viewed as permitting not only exemption from the
duty of care, but also from the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty requires managers to
act as fiduciaries in the best interests of the corporation, rather than for an improper mo-
tive or personal gain. This duty is manifested by courts’ enhanced review of transactions
that might be driven by managers’ personal interest, such as takeovers and self-dealing
transactions.
Most states’ statutes provide that directors can only be exempted for actions taken in
“good faith.” Laws that enable corporations to exempt directors from the duty of loyalty
typically provide that the exemption is not allowed if the conduct is intentional or willful.
The laws of Pennsylvania, Indiana and Vermont do not allow exemption for recklessness,
but do not have a good faith requirement.23 Broadly stated, recklessness is less culpable
than intention, but more culpable than negligence. We generally take the view that laws
that carve out recklessness do allow exemptions from duty of loyalty.
Similar distinctions arise in the context of indemnification provisions. These provisions
regulate the standard of liability for which directors can be indemnified both with respect
to suits by third parties, and derivative suits by or in the name of the corporation. First,
while some states, such as Delaware, allow indemnification for liability if the manager acted
in good faith,24 others, such as Maryland, permit indemnification without it.25 However,
while most states extend indemnification provisions to both directors and officers, most
states’ laws (including Delaware’s) extend exemption from liability to directors only, and
21e.g., California; Cal. Corp. Code § 204(10).
22e.g., Md. Corp. & Assns. § 2-405.2 and Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-692.1.
23See 15 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 1713; Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-35-1; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A §
2.02.
24Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145.
25Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-418.
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do not discuss officers at all. However, a few states, such as New Jersey and Nevada, extend
this protection to officers as well.26
Laws that protect managers from liability also differ as to whether they are default or
menu laws. Default rules apply if the corporate documents are silent, whereas menu laws
do not apply unless corporations explicitly opt in in the corporate documents. There is
literature demonstrating that menu provisions make it more likely that firms will adopt
corporate governance provisions, and that firms very rarely opt out of corporate governance
provisions embedded in default laws, especially if they are favorable to management (see
Ayres, 1992; Romano, 1993; Subramanian, 2002; Listokin, 2009). States may also use
default rules as a signal to firms about the appropriate level of culpability managers ought
to face. Most states, including Delaware, adopt the menu approach to liability exemptions.
This approach requires the board to obtain shareholder approval to effect a change to the
articles of incorporation. However, several states, such as Wisconsin, exempt directors by
a default rule.27 Only one state, Nevada, exempts officers from liability by default.28 In
fact, Nevada actually adopted a mandatory exemption in 2001, but changed it to a default
rule in 2003 (see Barzuza, 2012). We treat mandatory laws and default laws alike for the
purpose of the index because firms rarely opt out of default laws.
Indemnification laws are slightly different from exemption laws in this regard because
with few exceptions, they are embedded in menu options rather than default rules. An
important distinction among states’ indemnification laws is that under some statutes the
board has sole discretion to indemnify managers (including directors), whereas some statutes
require shareholder approval. The requirement for shareholder approval further depends on
the type of liability. Many states follow Delaware in allowing the board to indemnify
managers without shareholder approval if they acted in good faith. However, following
the Model Business Act, many states allow the board to indemnify directors even without
good faith if they obtain shareholder approval (by providing for such indemnification in
the articles of incorporation).29 Interestingly, the Model Business Act allows the board
to indemnify officers without shareholder approval even if they act without good faith.30
In this context, menu laws that do not require shareholder approval may be viewed as
equivalent to default rules because they enable managers to protect themselves or their
colleagues without input from shareholders.
We construct two indices, LP (DIR) and LP (OFF), to capture the degree to which
directors and officers are protected under each state’s laws over time. In our main specifi-
26E.g., N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14A:2-7.
27Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.0828.
28Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.138.
29Model Bus. Corp. Act §2.02(4).
30Model Bus. Corp. Act §8.56.
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cation, we rate each state as follows:
• Exemptions from liability: 2 points if there is no good faith requirement (or if exemp-
tion from duty of loyalty is expressly permitted); 1 point if exemption is permitted
subject to a good faith requirement; zero if exemption from gross negligence is not
permitted. We add one point if the exemption is the default rule and there is no good
faith requirement. The maximum score is three.
• Indemnification for liability: 2 points if there is no good faith requirement (or if in-
demnification for the duty of loyalty is expressly permitted); 1 point if indemnification
is permitted subject to a good faith requirement; zero if indemnification for gross neg-
ligence is not permitted. We add one point if the board can indemnify the director or
executive without shareholder approval and there is no good faith requirement. We
give a separate score for indemnification provisions as they relate to (a) third-party
lawsuits, and (b) corporate expenses in derivative suits, and divide the total score by
two, such that the maximum score is three.31
For both LP (DIR) and LP (OFF) indices, we generally add up the scores for exemption
and indemnification, such that the maximum score is six. But, when the exemption score
is higher than the indemnification score, we let the indemnification score be equal to the
exemption score; the rationale is that if the managers are exempted from liability, then
indemnification becomes irrelevant. For the first specification, we use a combined index LP
that ranges from 0 to 12 to proxy for the general level of liability protection for managers.
But for our main specification, we split the index into LP (DIR) and LP (OFF). We do
not include idiosyncratic provisions32 or non-exclusivity indemnification provisions in the
indices.33
31As noted in section 6.2 of the article, we also use as a robustness test a specification where
the indemnification score takes into account provisions that allow firms to indemnify managers for
liability for the settlement amounts in derivative suits. Several states, such asWisconsin and Georgia,
allow firms to provide directors and/or officers with such indemnification. However, it is uncertain
whether such provisions have bite since they contemplate the absurd result that the company as the
formal claimant in a derivative suit would indemnify the defendant. See Lockwood (2013).
32For example, Virginia law limits the liability of directors and officers by default to the greater of
$100,000 or his or her cash compensation over the year preceding the act or omission giving rise to
the liability, unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise and unless the director or officer
engaged in willful misconduct. Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-692.1. We gave Virginia a score of 4 on both
LP (OFF) and LP (DIR) because to exempt managers from full liability for breach of the duty of
loyalty requires shareholder approval.
33Many states’ indemnification statutes, including Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145(f)),
provide that statutory indemnification will not be deemed exclusive of other rights to which directors
or officers may be entitled under any bylaw or contractual agreement. These provisions however do
not seem to change the standard of liability for which indemnification is allowed (Lockwood, 2013).
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2.4 Summary
To illustrate the cross-sectional variation among states’ corporate laws, we present in
Table A4 the scores of each state with respect to the ATS, LP (DIR) and LP (OFF) indices
as of 2013.
3 The Effects of Corporate Law
One potential criticism of the empirical strategy we use is that corporate law does not
materially affect outcomes. In particular, it might be argued that anti-takeover statutes
do not affect the probability of takeovers. On this view, Delaware’s case law is highly
protective of management because it validates the poison pill, and the level of judicial review
is viewed by some as minimal (Kahan, 2006; Catan & Kahan, 2016; Cremers & Ferrell,
2014). Similarly, it could be argued that Nevada’s liability protections are not materially
more protective of management, either because other states already allow firms to exempt
managers from the duty of loyalty through a menu option (as opposed to Nevada’s default
rules) or because directors and officers are also heavily protected by insurance policies and
rarely pay out of pocket (Black et. al, 2006).
The question then is what explains the robustness of the results we obtain. One expla-
nation is that corporate laws do affect outcomes, at least to some extent. Delaware law is
generally associated with a higher takeover probability (Daines, 2001). While Delaware case
law has validated the poison pill, it also subjects it to judicial review under the Unocal and
Revlon standards. On the other hand, it may be argued that Delaware’s favorable takeover
environment stems primarily from the presence of an expert judiciary that resolves dis-
putes efficiently, and not from the lack of anti-takeover statutes, especially a pill validation
statute.
To test these claims we run logit regressions where the dependent variable is a 50%
completed takeover, and the coefficients of interest are the coefficients on the ATS index
or Pill Statute. We use standard controls used by Cremers et al. (2009), such as the
lagged industry adjusted Tobin’s Q and return on investment, as well as the number of
takeovers in the industry in the previous year. The results reported in columns (1) and
(2) in Table A5 show that the probability of takeover is negatively related to the ATS
index and Pill Statute. When alternatively we use a Delaware dummy as a coefficient of
interest (column (3) of Table A5), the results re-affirm the result in Daines (2001) that
Delaware law is associated with higher takeover probability. When we include both the
ATS index and the Delaware dummy (column (4) of Table A5), the coefficient on ATS
remains negative and the coefficient on the Delaware dummy remains positive. However,
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when we use Pill Statute instead of ATS, the coefficient on the Delaware dummy becomes
statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on Pill Statute is negative and statistically
significant (see column (5) of Table A5). Thus, takeover statutes, especially pill validation
statutes, are negatively correlated with higher takeover probability even when controlling
for Delaware incorporation; therefore, this suggests that takeover statutes do matter.34
Similarly, it may be argued that Nevada liability protections do make a significant dif-
ference. While directors and officers rarely pay out of pocket in shareholder litigation, there
is evidence that the quality of corporate governance, including the state of incorporation,
may affect the insurance premiums paid by corporations for director and officer insurance
(Baker & Griffith, 2007). Although there is no concrete data on this, it is likely that the
extent to which directors and officers can be exempted or indemnified for liability under
states’ corporate laws has an impact on such premiums. Moreover, while Nevada (as well
as other states) already allowed firms to exempt officers from the duty of loyalty prior to
2001 through a menu option, research has shown that firms do not always adopt menu
options, whereas firms virtually never opt out of default provisions that benefit managers
(Listokin, 2009). In fact, in a sample of 106 firms incorporated in Nevada in 2001, 35 firms
did not protect their managers from liability to the fullest extent permitted under Nevada
law (Eldar, 2016). Firms’ adoption of corporate governance provisions itself may be subject
to rational inertia, and firms therefore may be sluggish in amending their charters to benefit
from corporate menu options.
A second explanation is that even if the laws by themselves do not directly affect out-
comes, they are correlated with unobserved attributes of states’ legal systems. In particular,
states’ legislatures may signal a commitment to firms to protect certain interests, whether
they are those of shareholders, managers or local constituencies. Romano (2006) points out
that Delaware’s takeover-friendly environment is reflected in the legislature’s reluctance to
adopt many anti-takeover statutes. In fact, Bebchuk & Cohen (2003) justify the use of the
ATS index not by insisting that it is consequential, but rather by arguing that anti-takeover
statutes are viewed as potentially consequential by those making incorporation decisions.
Barzuza (2009) surveyed state anti-takeover laws and showed that the strength of poison
pill statutes and constituency statutes increased the likelihood that the courts would uphold
a dead hand pill. Thus, it is no surprise that Georgia and Pennsylvania, two states with
34These results are robust to using 30% or 100% completed takeovers, except that for 100%
completed takeovers the negative coefficient on ATS in the specification of column (4) of Table A5
is not statistically significant. Following Daines (2001), we also repeat these regressions using only
mature firms with at least five years in the sample and without firms that reincorporated at some
point in the sample period. The results are generally robust, except that in the specifications in
columns (4) and (5) of Table A5, the negative coefficients on ATS and Pill Statute, respectively,
are not statistically significant. Note though that the Delaware incorporation dummy does not only
control for Delaware’s quality but also encompasses the lack of anti-takeover statutes.
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five anti-takeover statutes, also have case law that validates the dead hand pill, whereas
Delaware has rejected its validity. Similarly, Nevada’s decision to make liability limitations
the default rule might be a signal to small firms that their interests will be protected under
Nevada law. This signal may even be viewed as part of a marketing campaign to attract
firms to Nevada (see Barzuza, 2012).
This explanation is also consistent with Kahan & Rock (2015) who argue that corporate
governance has symbolic value. Firms have adopted many pro-shareholder policies in recent
years, such as increasing shareholder access to the proxy, even though they arguably have
a trivial effect on the quality of governance. Consistent with our counterfactual analysis, a
scenario in which Delaware enacted many anti-takeover statutes is equally likely to trigger
fierce opposition by institutional investors because if anything, such statutes surely have
symbolic value in delineating the balance of power between shareholder and mangers.
4 Comparison of the Inertia Model to Alternative Models
In section 3 of the article we argued that our model of rational inertia better reflects
firms’ decision-making. In this section we further show that it better fits the data as
compared to alternative models. In particular, we examine a naive multinomial logit model
in which firms make a choice every period with or without a dummy for switching costs
(i.e., a dummy that equals 1 when a firm reincorporates into another jurisdiction). This
comparison is important because these alternative models which were used in prior literature
(e.g., Daines, 2002; Bebchuk & Cohen, 2003; Subramanian, 2004) yield different results,
and in particular, the elasticity in the demand for corporate law under these models is
significantly smaller. Accordingly, such models would predict smaller shifts (if any) in
market shares if Delaware became more protectionist by adopting more anti-takeover laws.
Table A6 shows the results for the multinomial logit model without switching costs in
column (1) and the model with switching costs in column (2). The coefficients on ATS are
either smaller in magnitude than in the inertia model without switching costs, or largely
insignificant in the model with switching costs. The coefficient on switching costs is very
strong (-8.15) and even larger than the Delaware fixed effect. Also, the dislike of larger
firms for LP (OFF) is trivial in these two models as compared to the inertia model.
In order to compare the models, we use a likelihood-based information criterion, known
as the Akaike Information Criterion (“AIC”). The rationale underlying the AIC is to evalu-
ate the distance between the fitted model and the unknown true model that generated the
observed data (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).35 The AIC is based on the value of the log-
35We note that in this context we cannot use a statistical test that compares only the likelihood
ratios because such a test can only be used to compare nested models, whereas the model of rational
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likelihood of the model evaluated at the parameter estimates, but it also takes into account
the number of parameters in order to penalize over-fitting. The AIC is computed as follows.
Given the likelihood function Lm (θ
m;x) of model m, data x and the parameter estimate
θˆm, AIC (m) := −2 logLm
(
θˆm;x
)
+ 2Km, where Km is the dimension of the parameter
vector θm.
Table A7 shows the value of AIC using different models and specifications. The lower
the AIC, the better the model fits that data. Burnham and Anderson (2002) suggest that a
heuristic model comparison can be based on the difference in AIC, and a model that has an
AIC which is 10 units greater than the best alternative model has little support from the
data (even when the value of the log likelihood is of a greater order of magnitude). It is clear
from the table that the multinomial model without switching costs is the worst model under
all specifications. A model with switching costs does substantially better because it better
explains the inertia in market shifts. However, it is inferior to our model of rational inertia.
For example, in the baseline model in column (1) of Table A7, the AIC of the switching costs
model is 26,704 and the AIC of the inertia model is 25,264. Since differences in AIC are
around 1,400, we can conclude that the switching costs model fails to explain substantive
aspects of the data that are captured by the rational inertia model.
Finally, as an alternative to the AIC, we also compute the Bayesian Information Cri-
terion (“BIC”), which is defined as follows: BIC (m) := −2 logLm
(
θˆm;x
)
+Km × ln(n),
where n is the number of firm year observations. The values of the BIC are largely the
same as the values of the AIC, and again, indicate that our model fits the data better than
other models.
5 Robustness
5.1 Alternative Specification with Combined LP Index
We consider a specification of our model that uses the combined LP index; we show the
estimation results for this specification in Table A8. The coefficient on LP, the combined
measure of managerial liability protection, is approximately 0.22 for the average firm. This
coefficient is large, especially for small firms with few institutional shareholders. This ev-
idence suggests that Nevada’s level of liability protection is mainly attractive to a specific
segment of the market, though all firms like some level of protection. Interestingly, the pref-
erence for LP increases when the average industry takeover premium is above the median.
This reflects the intuition that managers may be concerned about their liability when there
is a higher likelihood of takeovers.
inertia and the model with switching costs include different parameters.
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5.2 Linking the Costs of Choosing to Firm Characteristics
The model of inertia described in section 3 of the article is very parsimonious, as the
distribution of cost of attention is constant across firms. Although in that model firm-
specific characteristics influence the expected benefit of choosing (as they enter the indirect
utility from incorporation), characteristics do not directly affect the cost of making a choice
of incorporation. However, it may be that larger firms, or those with more institutional
shareholding, have access to more sophisticated legal counsel and face lower costs of choosing
the state of incorporation. Conversely, it may be that the greater complexity of large
firms’ operations generates higher costs of considering the incorporation decision. If some
firm characteristics that are associated with Delaware incorporation, such as firm size and
institutional ownership, make firms less likely to make a choice, our counterfactuals may be
overstating the decrease in market share that would follow a deterioration of Delaware law,
thus invalidating the finding that Delaware is subject to competitive pressure.
Hence, we let the cost of considering the incorporation choice for firm i at time t,
denoted as cit, be distributed iid according to a logistic distribution with parameters (µit, σ) ,
where µit = µ0 +
∑
r µrz
r
it. Hence, firm-specific observable characteristics have a linear
effect,36 through the coefficients µr, on the mean firm-specific cost of choosing a state of
incorporation. This model follows previous empirical studies of choice under inertia (Ho
et al. 2017, Handel 2013) that link the probability of choosing or switching to individual
characteristics. Since we do not observe when firms make choices, but only when they
change their states of incorporation, the parameters µ are identified from the covariation of
the probability of mid-stream reincorporation and firm specific characteristics.
The estimation results for this model, reported in Table A6, are substantially the same
as in the main specification in Table 5 of the article. Firm characteristics seem to have some
effect on the probability of choosing the state of incorporation: institutional ownership is
associated with higher cost of choosing the state of incorporation, and small and medium
firms face lower costs of attention than large firms. However, because larger firms tend to
have higher institutional shareholding there is no significant economic difference between the
costs of choosing across firms with different sizes. Accordingly, unreported counterfactual
analysis is virtually identical to that reported in Figures 6-9 in the main text.
36Richer specifications, allowing for nonlinear effects, are immediate extensions. However, neither
theory nor exploratory regressions of firm-level characteristics on the probability of reincorporation
suggest any particular nonlinear specification, so we adopt the parsimonious linear form.
13
5.3 Specifications without Fixed Effects
We consider specifications without state fixed effects. It might be argued that our
results, primarily the negative coefficients on anti-takeover statutes, derive solely from the
inclusion of fixed effects. In contrast, Bebchuk & Cohen (2003) find a positive coefficient
on anti-takeover statutes in a logit model where firms have a choice to incorporate in their
home state (coded as 1) or migrate to Delaware (coded as 0).
We first present results that replicate Bebchuk & Cohen’s basic finding in our sample.
As shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table A10, there is a positive correlation between the ATS
index and the decision to incorporate in the home state. As discussed in Kahan (2006),
the major problem with this specification is that it does not control for unobservable state
factors. To take one obvious example, California which does not have any of the anti-
takeover statutes included in the ATS index loses many firms to Delaware; yet the loss of
firms to Delaware is more plausibly related to other factors, primarily that California courts
are widely regarded as being unfavorable to business. Thus, the fixed effect of California in
our main specification in Table 5 in the article is very low as compared to Delaware.37
Second, states that have adopted anti-takeover statutes, such as Texas and Connecticut,
in the sample period have actually lost some, albeit small, market share (see Figure 11 in
the main text). Thus, when we add fixed effects to Bebchuk & Cohen (2003) the coefficient
on the ATS index is negative (columns 3 and 4 of Table A10).
Nonetheless, we emphasize that the signs on the coefficients we obtain in the inertia
model do not hinge on the inclusion of fixed effects. In fact, these signs are also robust to
specifications without controlling for inertia in decision-making. In Table A11, we report
two specifications without fixed effects, one for a simple multinomial logit model, and the
other with inertia in decision-making. Both specifications generate negative coefficients on
the ATS index that are actually larger than the equivalent specification with fixed effects.
This is not surprising because the fixed effects attribute most of the shift to Delaware to
institutional qualities or network effects, rather than the lack of anti-takeover statutes.
Bebchuk & Cohen (2003)’s model essentially assumes away the possibility that lack of anti-
takeover statutes may affect firms’ perceptions of Delaware incorporation. In contrast, our
model allows for this possibility, but also controls for unobservable factors.
37Second, many of the other states that have no anti-takeover statutes, such as Alaska and Al-
abama, have legislatures that are simply not attentive to business needs at all (whether driven
by managers or shareholders), and hence the lack of responsiveness arguably better explains their
inability to retain firms.
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Tables
Table A1: Incorporations by State in 2013
Column (2) presents each state’s market share for incorporations in 2013 for all firms in the sample.
Column (3) presents each state’s market share in 2013 for firms that incorporate out of the state
where their headquarters are located. Column (4) presents retention rate in 2013 by state, computed
as the ratio of the number of locally headquartered firms incorporated in the state to the num-
ber of firms headquartered in that state. All market shares and retention rates are in percentage points.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State Market Share Market Share of
Out-of-State
incorporations
Retention Rate
AK .06 .038 50
AL 0 0 0
AR .03 0 7.143
AZ .091 0 5.556
CA 1.602 .115 7.862
CO 1.27 .846 17.241
CT .212 0 10.145
DC 0 0 0
DE 64.148 81.284 100
FL 1.995 .615 31.447
GA .574 .077 22.667
HI .03 0 20
IA .181 .077 36.364
ID .06 .077 0
IL .333 0 8.397
IN .695 .231 47.222
KS .121 .038 20
KY .06 0 12.5
LA .121 .038 15.789
MA 1.028 .077 18.713
MD .967 .922 16.327
ME 0 0 0
MI .605 .038 33.929
MN 1.935 .192 65.556
MO .453 .154 26.19
MS .03 0 25
MT .06 .038 25
NC .514 .077 19.481
ND .03 .038 0
NE .06 0 12.5
NH 0 0 0
NJ .816 .423 11.594
NM 0 0 0
NV 10.429 11.606 71.667
NY 2.297 .922 18.909
OH 1.572 .231 51.111
OK .181 0 20.69
OR .605 .115 58.621
PA 1.239 .346 30.769
RI .091 .038 18.182
SC .121 .038 23.077
SD .06 0 100
TN .393 .038 25
TX 1.542 .231 13.158
UT .514 .192 28.571
VA 1.028 .538 23.529
VT 0 0 0
WA .816 .115 34.286
WI .877 .077 56.25
WV .03 0 25
WY .121 .115 20
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Table A2: Summary of Reincorporations
For each state, column (2) presents the total number of reincorporations into the state. Column (3)
reports the number of firms that migrate away from the state and reincorporate in another state.
Columns (4) and (5) report the number of firms that migrate away from the state and reincorporate
in Delaware and Nevada respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State Total
Reincorporations
In
Total
Reincorporations
Out
Total
Reincorporations
in DE
Total
Reincorporations
in NV
AK 0 1 1 0
AL 0 4 4 0
AR 0 1 1 0
AZ 0 6 4 1
CA 6 104 96 5
CO 7 55 34 11
CT 0 4 3 0
DC 0 0 0 0
DE 386 105 0 28
FL 27 31 22 6
GA 7 5 4 0
HI 0 1 1 0
IA 0 3 3 0
ID 0 6 6 0
IL 5 5 5 0
IN 5 2 2 0
KS 1 1 1 0
KY 0 2 1 0
LA 1 1 1 0
MA 1 12 9 0
MD 10 2 2 0
ME 0 1 1 0
MI 4 5 5 0
MN 4 23 16 3
MO 0 4 2 2
MS 1 1 0 1
MT 1 0 0 0
NC 1 2 2 0
ND 1 1 0 1
NE 0 1 0 0
NH 0 1 0 1
NJ 0 21 14 2
NM 0 3 1 1
NV 72 56 48 0
NY 0 46 42 1
OH 5 9 7 0
OK 4 5 2 0
OR 2 4 3 0
PA 8 8 5 2
RI 0 0 0 0
SC 0 0 0 0
SD 0 1 1 0
TN 5 3 3 0
TX 6 11 11 0
UT 2 14 10 2
VA 2 3 3 0
VT 1 0 0 0
WA 9 8 6 2
WI 3 3 3 0
WV 0 0 0 0
WY 4 6 1 3
Total 591 591 386 72
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Table A3: Anti-takeover Statutes
Statute Description
Business Business combination statutes prevent a bidder that gains control from
Combinations merging the target with its own assets for a specified period of time
(unless certain difficult-to-meet conditions are satisfied).
Constituency Statute allowing managers to take into account the interests of
Statute non-shareholders in defending against a takeover.
Control Share A control share acquisition statute requires a hostile bidder to put its offer
Acquisition to a vote of the shareholders before proceeding with it. If a bidder does
not do so and purchases a large block of shares, it is not able to vote
these shares at all and thus will not be able to gain control despite its
large holdings.
Fair-price A fair-price statute requires a bidder who succeeds in gaining control and
then proceeds with a second-step freeze-out (a transaction removing
remaining shareholders) to pay the remaining minority shareholders the
same price it paid for shares acquired through its bid.
Poison-pill Statutes that protect poison pills from judicial review. Poison pills are
Validation warrants or rights issued by the company that are triggered and entitle
their holders to significant value in the event that any buyer obtains a
significant block without the approval of the board.
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Table A4: Summary of State Law Indexes in 2013
State ATS Index Directors Protection
Index
Officers Protection
Index
AK 0 2 .5
AL 0 2 .5
AR 0 2 .5
AZ 5 4 3
CA 0 .5 .5
CO 1 2 .5
CT 4 1 1
DC 0 4.5 3
DE 1 2 .5
FL 4 2 .5
GA 4 4 3
HI 3 4 3
IA 3 4 2.5
ID 5 4 3
IL 4 2 .5
IN 5 6 1
KS 2 2 .5
KY 4 2 .5
LA 3 3 3
MA 4 2 1
MD 5 4 4
ME 3 4 3
MI 4 4 .5
MN 5 2 1
MO 5 3 2
MS 4 4 3
MT 0 4 .5
NC 4 4 .5
ND 1 2 1
NE 3 4 3
NH 0 4 4
NJ 4 2 2
NM 1 .5 .5
NV 5 6 6
NY 4 2 .5
OH 5 6 .5
OK 2 2 .5
OR 4 2 .5
PA 5 4 .5
RI 4 2 1
SC 4 .5 .5
SD 5 5 3
TN 5 2 .5
TX 3 2 1
UT 2 4 .5
VA 4 4 4
VT 1 4 .5
WA 3 4 2
WI 5 6 3
WV 0 3 3
WY 4 4 3
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Table A5: Takeover Probability Logit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ATS -0.120∗∗∗ -0.0574∗
(0.0206) (0.0343)
Pill Statute -0.469∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗
(0.0717) (0.133)
DE 0.419∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.148
(0.0670) (0.111) (0.124)
Q -0.0333∗∗∗ -0.0325∗∗∗ -0.0321∗∗∗ -0.0324∗∗∗ -0.0322∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0110)
ln(Cash) -0.645∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗ -0.651∗∗∗ -0.652∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.208)
Leverage 0.136∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.0237) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0235) (0.0234)
ROA 0.0310 0.0314 0.0327 0.0318 0.0317
(0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0325) (0.0324)
# Ind. Takeovers 0.0127 0.0121 0.0117 0.0118 0.0118
(0.00861) (0.00862) (0.00861) (0.00862) (0.00862)
Institutional Ownership -0.138 -0.155 -0.162 -0.156 -0.160
(0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
ln(Mkvalt) 0.0213 0.0183 0.0159 0.0172 0.0169
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0222)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo - R2 0.0176 0.0183 0.0179 0.0182 0.0185
Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table presents results of the maximum likelihood estimates of the logit model for the total
sample excluding observations with missing variables. The dependent variable is a dummy (target)
equal to 1 if the company is target of a 50% completed takeover. All variables not defined herewith
are defined in the Appendix. DE is a dummy equal to 1 if the company is incorporated in Delaware.
Q is the ratio of market-to-book value of assets, where market assets are defined as total assets plus
market value of common stock minus book common equity and differed taxes. ROA is the return on
assets. Leverage is the book debt to asset ratio. ln(Cash) is the natural log of cash and short-term
investments to assets ratio. ln(Mkvalt) is the natural log of market value. # Industry Takeovers
is equal to the number of 50% completed takeovers in the industry in the previous year, based on
the Fama-French 49 industry classification. Q, ROA, and ln(Cash) are all industry adjusted and
(together with ln(Mkvalt)) winsorized at the 1% level. All independent variables are measured at
the end of the fiscal year previous to the takeover event. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. The number of firm-year observations is 64,376, and there are 8,443 firms in the sample.
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Table A6: Rational Inertia Model with Firm-specific Cost of Incorporation Choice
ATS -0.4462 ∗∗∗ Home Bias 4.4327
(0.0980) (0.1230)
ATS × Small 0.0964 ∗∗ Home Bias × Small 0.8328∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.1228)
ATS × Medium 0.0501 Home Bias × Medium 0.6274∗∗∗
(0.0452) (0.1273)
ATS × Institutional Ownership -0.0625∗ Fixed Effect DE 7.5887∗∗∗
(0.0442) (0.2504)
ATS × Industry Premiumt−1 > median -0.0697
∗∗∗ Fixed Effect NV []∗∗∗
(0.0225) []
LP (DIR) 0.4554 µ 19.2105∗∗∗
(0.8595) (1.2483)
LP (DIR) × Small -0.1627∗∗∗ µSmall -2.2980
∗∗∗
(0.0689) (0.6315)
LP (DIR) × Medium -0.0915 µMedium -2.3905
∗∗∗
(0.0619) (0.6983)
LP (DIR) × Institutional Ownership 0.1987∗∗∗ µInstitutional Ownership 4.3215
∗∗∗
(0.0684) (0.9436)
LP (DIR)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0559 µ Industry Premiumt−1 > median 0.0599
(0.0377) (0.2694)
LP (OFF) 0.0685 Average µit 18.9781
(0.7899)
LP (OFF)× Small 0.3330∗∗∗ Average µit for Large Firms 22.0424
(0.0576)
LP (OFF)× Medium 0.0962 Average µit for Medium Firms 19.0090
(0.0598)
LP (OFF)× Institutional Ownership -0.7981∗∗∗ Average µit for Small Firms 17.4811
(0.0673)
LP (OFF)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0281 Average piit 1.15%
(0.0295 )
Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the rational inertia model,
with firm-specific cost of incorporation choice that depends on firm characteristics. The dependent
variable is a categorical variable that indicates the state of incorporation. Parameter estimates on
the left-hand side of the table reflect the effect of one unit of each variable on the latent utility index
of firms in the sample. Firms with less than three observations are not included. The number of
firm-year observations is 81,993, and there are 8,769 firms in the sample.
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Table A7: Multinomial Logit and Switching Costs Models
Multinomial Switching
Logit Costs
(1) (2)
ATS -0.1479∗∗∗ -0.0361
(0.0297) (0.0648)
ATS × Small 0.0077 -0.0248
(0.0145) (0.0321)
ATS × Medium -0.0181 -0.0730∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0305)
ATS × Institutional Ownership 0.0149 0.0643
(0.0151) (0.0397)
ATS × Industry Premiumt−1 > median -0.0418∗∗∗ -0.0674
(0.0074) (0.0187)
ATS × Manager > 15% 0.0727∗∗∗ 0.0440∗
(0.0106) (0.0264)
Average ATS -0.1743 -0.0898
- Small firms -0.1684 -0.0941
- Medium firms -0.1870 -0.1125
- Large firms -0.1653 -0.0219
LP (DIR) 0.2375∗∗∗ 0.2327∗
(0.0503) (0.1171)
LP (DIR) × Small -0.1122∗∗∗ -0.0104
(0.0212) (0.0528)
LP (DIR) × Medium 0.0094 0.0479
(0.0171) (0.0508)
LP (DIR) × Institutional Ownership 0.0628∗∗∗ 0.1096∗
(0.0246) (0.0644)
LP (DIR)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.0553∗
(0.0126) (0.0312)
LP (DIR) × Director > 15% -0.0569∗∗∗ -0.0008
(0.0161) (0.0454)
Average LP (DIR) 0.2556 0.3237
- Small firms 0.1758 0.2680
- Medium firms 0.3186 0.3637
- Large firms 0.3166 0.3326
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(1) (2)
LP (OFF) 0.2225∗∗∗ 0.2335 ∗∗
(0.0494) (0.1138)
LP (OFF)× Small 0.1491∗∗∗ 0.1435∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0407)
LP (OFF)× Medium -0.0738 ∗∗∗ -0.0699 ∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0400)
LP (OFF)× Institutional Ownership -0.4105∗∗∗ -0.5007∗∗∗
(0.0227) (0.0513)
LP (OFF)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0604∗∗∗ 0.0447
(0.0112) (0.0294)
LP (OFF)× Officer > 15% 0.0709∗∗∗ 0.0474
(0.0131) (0.0342)
Average LP (OFF) 0.0932 0.1360
- Small firms 0.3015 0.3576
- Medium firms -0.0744 -0.0424
- Large firms -0.0609 -0.0612
Home Bias 4.9118∗∗∗ 3.5110∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.1307)
Home Bias × Small 0.2584∗∗∗ 1.1842∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.1348)
Home Bias × Medium 0.3744∗∗∗ 0.9334∗∗∗
(0.0326) (0.1421)
DE Fixed Effect 7.0802∗∗∗ 6.2831∗∗∗
(0.1450) (0.1645)
NV Fixed Effect 3.6393∗∗∗ 2.4122∗∗∗
(0.2252) (0.4251)
CA Fixed Effect 0.7083∗∗∗ 0.5739∗∗∗
(0.1602) (0.2332)
NY Fixed Effect 1.9502∗∗∗ 1.3564∗∗∗
(0.1782) (0.2688)
Switching Cost -8.1463∗∗∗
(0.0737)
Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
This table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the multinomial logit model.
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that indicates the state of incorporation. The
parameter estimates reflect the effect of one unit of each variable on the latent utility index of
firms in the sample. Switching Costs is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm reincorporates in a new
a state in a given year. All variables not defined herewith are defined in the Appendix to the
article. The table reports in bold firm utility with respect to one unit of each legal characteristic by
firm size, given average firm characteristics (i.e., institutional ownership and managerial ownership)
and parameter estimates. All specifications include state fixed effects, here reported for Delaware,
Nevada, California and New York. The standard errors reported are computed using the Huber-
White formula; see Train (2009). Firms with less than three observations are not included. The
number of firm-year observations is 81,993, and there are 8,769 firms in the sample.
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Table A8: Goodness of Fit
Baseline With Takeovers With Takeovers and Insiders
(1) (2) (3)
MNL 191,108 191,066 190,960
Switching Costs 26,704 26,696 26,690
Inertia 25,264 25,264 25,256
The table reports the values of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for different models.
MNL is the multinomial logit model; see Table A7. Switching Costs is the multinomial
logit model that includes a Switching Costs dummy variable; see Table A7. Inertia is
the rational inertia model described in section 3 of the article; see Table 5 in the article.
Column (1) reports AIC values for the baseline model estimated without interacting state
characteristics with takeover variables (e.g., Ind. Premiumt−1 > median) and managerial
ownership dummies; see column (1) of Table 5 in the article. Column (2) reports AIC
values for models estimated with interacting state characteristics with Ind. Premiumt−1
> median; see column (2) of Table 5 in the article. Column (3) reports AIC values for
models estimated with interacting state characteristics with Ind. Premiumt−1 > median
and managerial ownership dummies; see column (3) of Table 5 in the article. Lower values
of AIC with respect to the same data specifications in each column indicate better fit.
Models that have an AIC which is 10 units greater than the best alternative model using
the same data have very little support from the data (Burnham and Anderson, 2002).
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Table A9: Rational Inertia Model with the Combined LP Index
(1) (2) (3)
ATS -0.4044∗∗∗ -0.3656∗∗∗ -0.3686∗∗∗
(0.0879) (0.0891) (0.0892)
ATS × Small 0.0106 0.0130 0.0024
(0.0390) (0.0396) (0.0398)
ATS × Medium 0.0014 0.0036 -0.0035
(0.0350) (0.0355) (0.0356)
ATS × Institutional Ownership 0.0169 0.0164 0.0174
(0.0389) (0.0394) (0.0397)
ATS × Industry Premiumt−1 > median -0.0710∗∗∗ -0.0713∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0214)
ATS × Manager > 15% 0.0816∗∗
(0.0320)
Average ATS -0.3931 -0.4017 -0.4038
- Small firms -0.3917 -0.4017 -0.4043
- Medium firms -0.3945 -0.4021 -0.4045
- Large firms -0.3934 -0.4010 -0.4016
LP 0.2733∗∗∗ 0.2474∗∗∗ 0.2489∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0316) (0.0317)
LP × Small 0.1228∗∗∗ 0.1205∗∗∗ 0.1222∗∗∗
(0.0231) (0.0234) (0.0235)
LP × Medium 0.0100 0.0081 0.0095
(0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0242)
LP × Institutional Ownership -0.2960∗∗∗ -0.2967∗∗∗ -0.2983∗∗∗
(0.0247) (0.0250) (0.0252)
LP× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0401∗∗∗ 0.0403∗∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0132)
LP × Manager > 15% -0.0154
(0.0182)
Average LP 0.2229 0.2227 0.2235
- Small firms 0.3601 0.3606 0.3617
- Medium firms 0.1362 0.1352 0.1360
- Large firms 0.0820 0.0816 0.0818
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(1) (2) (3)
Home Bias 4.4198∗∗∗ 4.4160∗∗∗ 4.4181∗∗∗
(0.1094) (0.1102) (0.1104)
Home Bias × Small 0.9031∗∗∗ 0.9042∗∗∗ 0.9032∗∗∗
(0.1072) (0.1078) (0.1080)
Home Bias × Medium 0.6035∗∗∗ 0.6047∗∗∗ 0.6059∗∗∗
(0.1098) (0.1105) (0.1107)
DE Fixed Effect 7.5641∗∗∗ 7.5674∗∗∗ 7.5691∗∗∗
(0.1872) (0.1870) (0.1873)
NV Fixed Effect 4.7307∗∗∗ 4.7582∗∗∗ 4.7538∗∗∗
(0.4429) (0.4520) (0.4460)
CA Fixed Effect 1.0133∗∗∗ 1.0097∗∗∗ 1.0100∗∗∗
(0.1867) (0.1865) (0.1868)
NY Fixed Effect 2.7568∗∗∗ 2.7624∗∗∗ 2.7644∗∗∗
(0.3736) (0.3749) (0.3753)
Average pi 1.18% 1.18% 1.18%
Standard Errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the rational inertia model.
The dependent variable is a categorical variable that indicates the state of incorporation. The
parameter estimates reflect the effect of one unit of each variable on the latent utility index of firms
in the sample. All variables not defined herewith are defined in the Appendix. The table reports in
bold firm utility with respect to one unit of each legal characteristic by firm size, given average firm
characteristics (i.e., institutional ownership and managerial ownership) and parameter estimates.
All specifications include state fixed effects, here reported for Delaware, Nevada, California and
New York. The average p is the mean across firms-years of the probability that a firm makes
an incorporation choice in any given year, obtained according to the formula in equation 4. The
standard errors reported are computed using the Huber-White formula; see Train (2009). Firms
with less than three observations are not included. The number of firm-year observations is 81,993,
and there are 8,769 firms in the sample.
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Table A10: Logit Regressions for In-State Incorporation
Dependent Variable: In-State Incorporation
Without State FE With State FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ATS 0.2259∗∗∗ 0.1040∗∗∗ -0.3069∗∗∗ -0.3132∗∗∗
(0.0922) (0.0058) (0.0304) (0.0309)
LP (DIR) 0.2654∗∗∗ 0.1083∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0549)
LP (OFF) -0.0886∗∗∗ -0.2250∗∗∗
(0.0081) (0.0519)
Pseudo R2 0.0473 0.0604 0.1179 0.1181
Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
This table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters for Logit regressions. The de-
pendent variable is a binary variable that indicates in-state incorporation. The parameter estimates
reflect the effect of one unit of each variable on the latent utility index of firms in the sample. The
specifications in columns (1) and (2) do not include state fixed effects; specifications in columns
(1) and (2) include instead the full set of state fixed effects. All specifications include two-digit
industry dummy variables. Firms with less than three observations are not included. The number
of firm-year observations is 81,993, and there are 8,769 firms in the sample.
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Table A11: Multinomial Logit and Rational Inertia Model without Fixed Effects
Multinomial Inertia
Logit
(1) (2)
ATS -0.2791∗∗∗ -0.3275∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0868)
ATS × Small 0.0462∗∗∗ 0.1335∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0423)
ATS × Medium -0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0551
(0.0061) (0.0386)
ATS × Institutional Ownership -0.0315∗∗∗ -0.1013∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0419)
ATS × Industry Premiumt−1 > median -0.0198∗∗∗ -0.0341
(0.0046) (0.0209)
LP (DIR) 0.0872∗∗∗ 0.0628
(0.0106) (0.1450)
LP (DIR) × Small -0.0296∗∗∗ -0.0145
(0.0101) (0.0614)
LP (DIR) × Medium 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0120
(0.0083) (0.0476)
LP (DIR) × Institutional Ownership 0.0419∗∗∗ 0.1058
(0.0119) (0.0718)
LP (DIR)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0264
(0.0066) (0.0351)
LP (OFF) 0.0280∗∗ -0.2529∗
(0.0136) (0.1374)
LP (OFF)× Small 0.0245∗ 0.3911∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0531)
LP (OFF)× Medium -0.1919 ∗∗∗ 0.0565
(0.0122) (0.0427)
LP (OFF)× Institutional Ownership -0.6719∗∗∗ -1.2296
(0.0169) (0.0646)
LP (OFF)× Ind. Premiumt−1 > median -0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0291)
Standard Errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
This table reports maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the multinomial logit model
and of the rational inertia model without fixed effects. The dependent variable is a categorical
variable that indicates the state of incorporation. The parameter estimates reflect the effect of one
unit of each variable on the latent utility index of firms in the sample. All variables not defined
herewith are defined in the Appendix to the article. These specifications do not include state
fixed effects. Firms with less than three observations are not included. The number of firm-year
observations is 81,993, and there are 8,769 firms in the sample.
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